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“Handguns and drug deals are frequent 
companions, but not good friends. Rip-offs 
happen. Shootings do to. Caveat emptor. Caveat 
venditor. People get hurt. People get killed. 
Sometimes, the buyer. Other times, the seller.”
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Watt in R. v. Simon, 2010 ONCA 754 at para. 1.
INTERROGATION TRILOGY 
RELEASED
The Supreme Court of Canada, in what is being 
called an interrogation trilogy, released three 
companion cases which now help define the limits 
on the right to counsel found in s. 10(b) of the 
Charter. Questions to be decided included whether a 
detainee has a constitutional right to further 
consultations with counsel during  the course of an 
interrogation or whether the right to counsel is spent 
at the outset, upon an initial consultation with a 
lawyer. As well, the Court also needed to decide 
whether a detainee has the right to the presence of 
lawyer, on their request, during  a custodial 
interrogation and to what extent police must hold off 
questioning  until a detainee has had an opportunity 
to consult with counsel of their choice. See pages 24 
to 30 for a summary of these important cases. 
POLICE LEADERSHIP 2011
Did you know that comedian Ron James will be the 
featured entertainment during  the Police Leadership 
2011 Conference banquet?  Check out pages 18-20 
for more details. 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds
“Drinking and driving prosecutions 
involve a continuum of findings, 
beg inning w ith a re asonable 
suspicion the driver has alcohol in his 
or her body. ...  At the other end of the continuum, is the 
standard for conviction, proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the operator’s ability to operate a motor 
vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol or 
that the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was over 
the legal limit. Between suspicion and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt lies reasonable and probable 
grounds. ... Reasonable and probable grounds does not 
amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt or to a 
prima face case.– Ontario Court of Appeal Justice 
Durno in R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554 at paras. 36-37. 
Read more on page 5.
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5
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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Note-able Quote
“Police must make choices, wrenching 
choices, with little time to consult or reflect 
before they are taken. They are heavily 
criticized when they are wrong. They are 
frequently criticized even when they are 
legally correct but hindsight and fresh facts 
suggest alternatives to force or arrest.” - 
Alberta Court of Appeal Justice McClung, R. v. 
Kephart (1998), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Alta.C.A.)  
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Assessing learning:  standards, principles, and 
procedures. 
Morry Fiddler, Catherine Marienau, Urban Whitaker; 
with a foreword by David O. Justice.
Dubuque, Iowa : Kendall/Hunt Pub., c2006.
LB 2822.75 F53 2006
ASTD handbook for measuring  and evaluating 
training. 
Patricia Pulliam Phillips, editor.
Alexandria, VA: American Society for Training  & 
Development, 2010.
HF 5549.5 T7 A869 2010
Becoming  a leader the Annapolis way: 12 combat 
lessons from the Navy's leadership laboratory. 
W. Brad Johnson, Gregory P. Harper.
New York : McGraw-Hill, c2005.
HD 57.7 J647 2005
The bully at work: what you can do to stop the 
hurt and reclaim your dignity on the job. 
Gary Namie and Ruth Namie.
Naperville, Ill. : Sourcebooks, Inc., c2009.
HF 5549.5 E43 N348 2009
The Canadian justice system: an overview.
Paul Atkinson.
Markham, ON : LexisNexis Canada, 2010.
KE 444 A85 2010
The Center for Creative Leadership handbook of 
leadership development.
Ellen Van Velsor, Cynthia D. McCauley, Marian N. 
Ruderman, editors; foreword by John R. Ryan.
San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, 2010.
HD 57 C38 2010
Change management and strategic planning. 
[videorecording] 
Roberta Katz;
production services provided by Stanford Video ; 
director, Danny Zemanek.
[Stanford, Calif.]: Stanford Video; Mill Valley, CA: 
Kantola Productions; Toronto, ON : Kinetic Video 
[distributor], c2006.
1 videodisc (47 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in.
Presented in the lecture series: Stanford breakfast 
briefings.
Taped live January 11, 2006, at Stanford University.
Roberta Katz, Associate Vice President, Strategic 
Planning, at Stanford University, presents six 
principles for the effective implementation of a 
strategic plan, provides examples of each, and 
discusses current efforts within Stanford University 
that provide a model for organizational change.
HD 30.28 C52 2006 D1039
A coach's guide to developing exemplary leaders: 
making the most of the leadership  challenge and 
the leadership practices inventory (LPI).
James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner with Elaine 
Biech.
San Francisco: Pfieffer, 2010.
HD 30.4 K68 2010
Generations, Inc.: from boomers to linksters -
managing  the friction between generations at 
work. 
Meagan Johnson and Larry Johnson.
New York: AMACOM, c2010.
HF 5549.5 M5 J65 2010
Handling  difficult people and situations: lead 
people through adversity.
 by Rick Conlow, Doug Watsabaugh.
[Rochester, NY] : Axzo Press, 2009.
HD 42 C655 2009
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How to recognize & reward employees: 150 ways 
to inspire peak performance.
Donna Deeprose.
New York : AMACOM, c2007.
HF 5549.5 I5 D43 2007
How to succeed at an assessment centre: 
essential preparation for psychometric tests, 
group and role-play exercises, panel  interviews 
and presentations.
Harry Tolley, Robert Wood.
London ; Philadelphia, PA : Kogan Page, 2010.
HF 5549.5 E5 T65 2010
How to survive the end of the world as we know 
it: tactics, techniques, and technologies for 
uncertain times. 
James Wesley Rawles.
New York, N.Y. : Plume/Penguin Group, c2009.
The ultimate guide to total preparedness and self-
reliance, this work, written by one of the best-known 
survival experts, contains everything  people need to 
know in order to prepare and protect themselves.
GF 86 R39 2009
The human brain book. 
Rita Carter ... [et al.] ; consultants, Chris Frith, Uta 
Frith, and Melanie Shulman.
London ; New York, N.Y. : DK Pub., c2009.
RC 386.6 B7 C37 2009
If only I'd said that: Volume V.
Peter Legge.
Burnaby, B.C. : Eaglet Publishing, c2009.
BF 637 S8 L445 2009
Leading  across boundaries: creating  collaborative 
agencies in a networked world
Russell M. Linden.
San Francisco, CA : Jossey-Bass, c2010.
HD 30.3 L547 2010
The mindfulness solution: everyday practices for 
everyday problems.
Ronald D. Siegel.
New York : Guilford Press, c2010.
BF 637 M4 S54 2010
A mindfulness-based stress reduction workbook. 
Bob Stahl, Elisha Goldstein.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, c2010.
RA 785 S73 2010
Short pants to striped trousers: the life and  times 
of a judge in skid road Vancouver.
Wallace Gilby Craig.
Vancouver, B.C. : W.G. Craig, c2003.
KE 416 C73 A3 2003
Statistics workbook for dummies.
Deborah Rumsey.
Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley, c2005.
HA 29 R842 2005
Stop bullying  at work:  strategies and tools for HR 
& legal professionals.
Teresa A. Daniel.
Alexandria, Va.: Society for Human Resource 
Management, c2009.
HF 5549.5 E43 D36 2009
The stress effect:  why smart leaders make dumb 
decisions - and what to do about it.
by Henry L. Thompson.
San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass; 
Chichester: John Wiley [distributor], c2010.
HD 30.23 T468 2010
Think again:  why good leaders make bad 
decisions and how to keep it from happening to 
you. 
Sydney Finkelstein, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew 
Campbell.
Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Press, c2008.
HD 30.23 F555 2008
Understanding girl bullying and what to do about 
it : strategies to help heal the divide.
Julaine E. Field ... [et al.].
Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Corwin Press, c2009.
From the Publisher: Girl bullying-or relational 
aggression-is a very real and pervasive problem in 
today's schools, and studies indicate that bullying 
between girls can be more covert than between 
Volume 10 Issue 6 - November/December 2010
PAGE 5
boys, thus making  it more difficult for school 
professionals to detect and address.
LB 3013.32 U63 2009
Virtual training basics.
Cindy Huggett.
Alexandria, Va. : ASTD Press ; London : Eurospan 
[distributor], 2010.
HF 5549.5 T7 H84 2010
Volunteer administration: professional practice.
Council for Certification in Volunteer Administration.
Markham, Ont. : LexisNexis Canada, 2010.
HN 49 V64 V636 2010
CONSUMPTION PLUS 
UNEXPLAINED ACCIDENT 
MAY PROVIDE REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554
Shortly after midnight the police 
received a call about an erratic driver 
believed to be impaired. The caller, 
who remained on the phone with a 
dispatcher, followed the driver. He 
swerved towards the curb, bounced off it and drove 
up onto it, narrowly missing  a light post. The citizen 
had tried numerous times to get the accused’s 
attention by flashing  his headlights but it proved 
fruitless. Before police arrived the accused’s vehicle 
rear ended a truck parked at the roadside in a well 
lit residential neighbourhood. The truck was forced 
across other lanes of traffic and into a light pole, 
snapping  off its rear axle. The dispatcher advised 
responding  officers that a civilian reported erratic 
driving  and believed the driver was intoxicated. 
Within about a minute of arriving  on scene, and 
without asking  the accused if he had been drinking 
or how the accident happened, the officer arrested 
him for impaired operation and made an Intoxilyzer 
demand. The accused had a dazed look on his face, 
his eyes were red and glassy, he was swaying  back 
and forth while standing, and he had an odour of 
alcohol on his breath. The accused subsequently 
provided breath samples over the legal limit.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the officer said 
made the arrest and demand as a result of his 
observations of the accused, the information he 
received from the dispatcher, and the circumstances 
of the accident itself. The roads were clear and dry, 
the truck was moved on impact, and the airbags had 
been deployed. He believed the accused’s ability to 
operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol. 
But the officer acknowledged he had no grounds to 
believe the accused was impaired only on the basis 
of what the dispatcher had told him. He also agreed 
that it was not unusual for the airbag  powder to get 
into a person’s eyes, causing  them to become red 
and watery. 
The accused argued, in part, that the arresting  officer 
objectively lacked reasonable and probable grounds 
to arrest and make a breath demand. However, the 
trial judge found the arresting  officer was entitled to 
rely on the civilian’s opinion regarding  the driver’s 
intoxication and was not required to obtain 
confirmatory evidence before acting  on it. The 
civilian observed the erratic driving, called police, 
and followed the car. Looking  at the grounds 
collectively and not individually, the judge found 
reasonable and probable grounds existed. She 
concluded it was “not an exercise in building  blocks 
where the incriminatory grounds lose value in the 
face of the absence of certain other usual 
grounds.”  An explanation for one indicator of 
impairment such as red and glassy eyes did not 
render the officer’s observations unreliable. Nor was 
it necessary for the officer to have given an approved 
screening  device test before arresting  the accused. 
The accused was convicted of both impaired driving 
and over 80mg%, with the over 80mg% count 
conditionally stayed. He received a $700 fine and a 
12 month driving prohibition. 
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice was successful. The appeal judge noted the 
arrest was made within a minute of the officer’s 
arrival and no further enquiries were made of either 
the accused or the civilian witness. “It may be that 
the officer thought that alcoholic breath plus an 
accident equals impaired by alcohol,”  said the 
appeal judge. He was not satisfied that the trial 
judge assessed the totality of the surrounding 
circumstances in determining  if the officer had 
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reasonable and probable grounds. The conviction 
appeal was allowed and a new 
trial was ordered.
The Crown then appealed to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal 
submitting, in part, that the 
a p p e a l j u d g e e r r e d b y 
endorsing  an approach to 
reasonable and probable grounds that excluded 
from consideration any indicia of impairment which 
could be attributed to another cause and required 
officers to conduct interviews before determining  if 
reasonable and probable grounds exist.  The 
accused, on the other hand, argued that the 
reasonable and probable grounds issue was entirely 
fact-driven and that the trial judge erred in finding 
reasonable and probable grounds existed. 
Reasonable and Probable Grounds
Justice Durno, speaking  for the unanimous Ontario 
Court of Appeal, held the the trial judge applied 
both the proper standard of proof and appropriately 
took into consideration the context in which the 
demand was made in analyzing  the reasonable and 
probable grounds standard in drinking  and driving 
cases. He stated:
Drinking  and driving prosecutions involve a 
continuum of findings, beginning with a 
reasonable suspicion the driver has alcohol in 
his or her body, the standard for an Approved 
Screening Device (roadside) demand pursuant to 
s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.   At the other end 
of the continuum, is the standard for conviction, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
operator’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
impaired by the consumption of alcohol or that 
the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was 
over the legal limit.
Between suspicion and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt lies reasonable and probable 
grounds.   Section 254(3) of the Criminal Code 
authorizes peace officers to demand Intoxilyzer 
breath samples provided the officer “has 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
a person is committing or at any time within the 
preceding three hours has committed” the 
offence of impaired operation or driving ‘over 
80.’   …  Reasonable and probable grounds does 
not amount to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or to a prima 
face case.
Reasonable and probable grounds 
have both a subjective and an 
o b j e c t i v e c o m p o n e n t .  Th e 
subjective component requires the 
officer to have an honest belief the suspect 
committed the offence. The officer’s belief must 
be supported by objective facts. The objective 
component is satisfied when a reasonable 
person placed in the position of the officer 
would be able to conclude that there were 
indeed reasonable and probable grounds for the 
arrest. [references omitted, paras. 36-38]
And further:
In the context of a breath demand, the 
reasonable and probable grounds standard is not 
an onerous test. It must not be inflated to the 
context of testing trial evidence.   Neither must it 
be so diluted as to threaten individual freedom.
There is no necessity that the defendant be in a 
state of extreme intoxication before the officer 
has reasonable and probable grounds to arrest. 
Impairment may be established where the 
prosecution proves any degree of impairment 
from slight to great. Slight impairment to drive 
relates to a reduced ability in some measure to 
perform a complex motor function whether 
impacting  on perception or field of vision, 
reaction or response time, judgment, and regard 
for the rules of the road.
The test is whether, objectively, there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe the 
suspect’s ability to drive was even slightly 
impaired by the consumption of alcohol. … 
[references omitted, paras. 46-48]
The trial judge considered all of the circumstances 
and did not err in considering  indicia of impairment 
for which there could have been other explanations 
resulting  from the accident. Contrary to the Superior 
Court judge’s ruling, the accident did not muddy the 
waters and the trial judge did not fail to assess all of 
the surrounding circumstances: 
“Reasonable and probable 
grounds does not amount to 
proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or to a prima face case.”  
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Whether reasonable and probable grounds exist 
is a fact-based exercise dependent upon all the 
circumstances of the case.  The totality of the 
circumstances must be considered. That an 
accident occurred, including the circumstances 
under which it occurred and the possible effects 
of it, must be taken into account by the officer 
along with the other evidence in determining 
whether there are reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest for impaired driving.  
Consumption plus an unexplained accident may 
generate reasonable and probable grounds 
although that may not always be the case.  
In assessing  whether reasonable and probable 
grounds existed, trial judges are often improperly 
asked to engage in a dissection of the officer’s 
grounds looking  at each in isolation, opinions 
that were developed at the scene “without the 
luxury of judicial reflection”. However, it is 
neither necessary nor desirable to conduct an 
impaired driving trial as a threshold exercise in 
determining  whether the officer’s belief was 
reasonable.
An assessment of whether the officer objectively 
had reasonable and probable grounds does not 
involve the equivalent of an impaired driver 
scorecard with the list of all the usual indicia of 
impairment and counsel noting  which ones are 
present and which are absent as the essential 
test.  There is no mathematical formula with a 
certain number of indicia being  required before 
reasonable and probable grounds objectively 
existed. The absence of some indicia that are 
often found in impaired drivers does not 
necessarily undermine a finding of reasonable 
and probable grounds based on the observed 
indicia and available information.  
Consideration of the totality of the circumstances 
includes the existence of an 
accident. However, that the accident 
could have caused some of the 
indicia relied upon when they could 
also have been caused by the 
consumption of alcohol does not 
mean the officer has to totally 
el iminate those indicia f rom 
consideration. They have to be 
considered along with all the other indicia in 
light of the fact there may be another 
explanation.  … [references omitted, paras. 
54-57]
In this case, the trial judge appropriately considered 
that the arresting  officer took the accident into 
consideration in determining  whether reasonable 
and probable grounds objectively existed. The fact 
that “there might be another explanation for some of 
the factors the officer properly took into account in 
forming  his opinion of impairment to drive did not 
eliminate the indicia or render them unreliable,” 
said Justice Durno.  
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
argument that the officer rushed to justice by 
arresting  him within a minute or less of arriving  at 
the scene without doing  more investigation,  such as 
making  a roadside breath demand, asking  the 
accused if he had been drinking, or asking  him and 
other witnesses at the scene how the accident 
happened:
There is no minimum time period nor mandatory 
questioning that must occur before an officer 
can objectively have reasonable and probable 
grounds.  There is no requirement that a roadside 
sample be taken.  The ASD provides evidence of 
the blood alcohol concentration in the suspect’s 
blood, not evidence of impairment.  The trial 
judge correctly found that if the officer 
subjectively and objectively had reasonable and 
probable grounds that withstand judicial 
scrutiny, the failure to invoke the roadside 
screening provisions was irrelevant.  If the 
officer’s belief failed to meet the requisite 
standard, there was a s. 8 Charter violation.
A trained police officer is entitled to draw 
inferences and make deductions drawing  on 
experience.   Here, the investigating officer had 
18  years’ experience.  The trial 
judge was entitled to take into 
consideration that experience 
and t ra in ing in assess ing 
whether he objectively had 
reasonab le and p robab le 
g rounds . I n add i t i on , i n 
determining  whether reasonable 
and probable grounds exist, the 
officer is entitled to rely on hearsay. [references 
omitted, paras. 60-61]
“A trained police officer is 
entitled to draw inferences 
and make deductions 
drawing on experience.”  
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And further:
In making his or her determination, the officer is 
not required to accept every explanation or 
statement provided by the suspect. That the 
officer turned out to be under a misapprehension 
is not determinative. The important fact is not 
whether the officer's belief was accurate.  It is 
whether it was reasonable at the time of the 
arrest. That the conclusion was drawn from 
hearsay, incomplete sources, or contained 
assumptions will not result in its rejection based 
on facts that emerge later. What must be 
assessed are the facts as understood by the 
peace officer when the belief was formed.   
An officer is required to assess the situation and 
competently conduct the investigation he or she 
feels appropriate to determine if reasonable and 
probable grounds exist.   In some cases, that 
might include interviewing  witnesses and/or the 
suspect if necessary. In others, the officer’s 
observations and information known at the time 
may readily establish the requisite grounds. 
[references omitted, paras. 66-67]
Although the officer could have asked the accused if 
he had consumed alcohol, the weight to be attached 
to the answer would have been for the officer to 
determine.  “If he said he had one beer or nothing  to 
drink, the officer was not required to accept what he 
was told and terminate the investigation,” said 
Justice Durno:
The officer could have asked the [accused] how 
the accident occurred. However, if he provided 
an explanation unrelated to intoxication, the 
officer was not required to accept the 
explanation and eliminate the accident from 
consideration.  At trial, the [accused] admitted 
that he hit the curb because he was making  cell 
phone calls and looking  up numbers as he 
drove.  His cell phone records confirmed he 
made six calls to his girlfriend which were 
continually disconnecting within five minutes of 
the accident.  Continuing  to make telephone 
calls while driving into curbs could also be seen 
as a sign of impairment.
The issue is not whether the officer could have 
conducted a more thorough investigation.  The 
issue is whether, when the officer made the 
breath demand, he subjectively and objectively 
had reasonable and probable grounds to do so.  
That the belief was formed in less than one 
minute is not determinative. That an opinion of 
impairment of the ability to operate a motor 
vehicle can be made in under a minute is 
neither surprising nor unusual. 
Here, the officer could rely on the report of 
erratic driving that appeared to be consistent 
with the driver being  intoxicated, that the driver 
had struck a truck the officer knew was parked at 
the extreme side of the road with ample space 
for cars to pass, propelling the truck to the other 
side of the road, that the [accused] had the 
odour of alcohol on his breath, bloodshot eyes, 
and was swaying. Finally, when the officer asked 
the [accused] if he was okay he said that he was.  
[references omitted, paras. 69-71]
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the trial 
judge considered the appropriate factors and 
correctly found the officer objectively had 
reasonable and probable grounds. The accused’s 
appeal was allowed and his conviction and sentence 
were restored.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
THREE JUDGES, THREE 
DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON 
LEGALITY OF ARREST
R. v. Loewen, 2010 ABCA 255
 
After stopping  the accused for 
speeding, an officer noticed the 
smell of freshly burnt marijuana 
coming  from the vehicle and saw a 
duffle bag  on the back seat. The 
accused identified himself verbally by name but 
could not produce a driver’s licence. The officer 
invited him to move into the police vehicle to check 
his identity. But before getting  in, the officer patted 
the accused down for officer safety reasons, 
discovering  $5,410 in cash. The accused then 
admitted that he misidentified himself and a new 
name was provided. After issuing  a speeding  ticket 
under the second name, the officer arrested him for 
possessing  a controlled substance and indicated he 
was going  to search the vehicle. The officer found 
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100 grams of cocaine in the vehicle and the accused 
then provided his real name.
 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
Crown noted that possession of less than 30 grams 
of marijuana was only a summary conviction 
offence and the officer could not, by smell alone, 
determine quantity. Therefore, any arrest for that 
offence would have to be under s. 495(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code (finds committing). However, the 
Crown submitted that the large bundle of cash found 
on the accused implied trafficking, which suggested 
quantities over 30 grams, justifying  an arrest under s. 
495(1)(a) (on reasonable grounds). The accused, on 
the other hand, contended that the officer did not 
see any marijuana and therefore did not “find” him 
committing  an offence as required by s. 495(1)(b). 
The smell could not amount to “finding” an offence 
being  committed because the smell of burnt 
marijuana did not give sufficient grounds for arrest, 
since burnt marijuana was at best indicative of past 
possession, not present possession. The trial judge 
agreed with the Crown and found the officer had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused under s.
495(1)(a) and the search that followed was 
reasonable. “What the cash adds to the smell is an 
indication of buying  or selling  of drugs in a relatively 
large quantity,” said the judge. “That brings this 
arrest under Section 495(1)(a).” There were no 
Charter breaches and, even if there were, the 
evidence would have been admitted. The accused 
was convicted of possessing  a controlled substance 
for the purpose of trafficking.
 
The accused then challenged his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing  the evidence against 
him was obtained from an illegal search that 
followed an unlawful arrest. But a majority of the 
Court of Appeal disagreed, albeit for different 
reasons.
 
So Say One: s. 495(1)(a) or (b) Applied
 
Justice Slatter first noted that ss. 495(1)(a) and (2)(e) 
refer to “reasonable” grounds while ss. 495(1)(c) and 
(2)(d) refer to “reasonable and probable” grounds. 
On the other hand s. 495(1)(b) does not refer to any 
“grounds”, but requires the officer “find” the person 
committing  an offence. The test for arrest under s. 
495(1)(b) is whether “the peace officer himself finds 
a situation in which a person is apparently 
committing  an offence”. The opinion of the peace 
officer must be both honestly held and reasonable.
 
In discussing  the reasonable grounds standard, 
Justice Slatter stated:
 
The criminal law has different standards of proof 
for different issues. A peace officer who has 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” impaired 
driving  may request a roadside breath sample: 
Criminal Code, s. 254(2). A peace officer who 
has “reasonable grounds to believe” impaired 
driving has occurred can require a breath 
sample to determine the amount of alcohol in 
the blood: Criminal Code, s. 254(3). The concept 
of a standard of proof is generally applied in 
judicial proceedings when rights are being 
determined. However, many of these collateral 
tests, like “reasonable grounds” are applied to 
non-judicial actors exercising public authority. 
In this context these concepts are not truly 
“standards of proof”. Because they are intended 
to impose a standard of conduct on public 
officials, they do not serve the same purpose as a 
standard of proof in judicial proceedings. Some 
of these standards are more commonly used for 
“threshold” issues that do not finally decide 
rights, and which often must be decided quickly 
and on an ex parte basis. [para. 13]
 
The recognized cases relating  to determining 
reasonable grounds by judicial officers or in quasi-
judicial proceedings “do not necessarily set the 
standard of conduct expected of a police officer on 
the streets who must make decisions without the 
luxury of long  reflection.” He found “reasonable and 
probable grounds” did not require a “prima facie 
case” nor mean “more likely than not on a balance 
of probabilities”. Rather, “‘reasonable grounds’ 
conveys more the idea of an event not unlikely to 
occur for reasons that rise above mere suspicion.” 
He cited the following example:
 
Many things can reasonably be anticipated to 
occur, without it being probable that they will 
occur. In the summer, it is reasonable to 
anticipate a thunderstorm, even though 
thunderstorms are not probable, in the sense that 
thunderstorms do not happen on more days than 
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not. But if a thunderstorm occurs, one is not 
surprised, because that circumstance is not 
unreasonable. Likewise, if one goes to a 
shopping mall, it is not unreasonable to expect 
to see a parent pushing  twins in a stroller, even 
though that event would likely not be observed 
more frequently than on one-half of all visits, 
and is therefore not “probable”. [para. 17]
 
“It follows that a belief in the existence of a set of 
facts can be ‘reasonable’ even if the existence of 
those facts is not ‘probable’”, said Justice Slatter. “In 
this context ‘reasonable’ relates to legitimate 
expectations that a fact exists, without being  able to 
say that it is ‘more likely than not’.”
 
Here the officer had the necessary subjective belief 
that there were controlled substances in the car. 
Even though he may have been “torn” about 
whether he would find marijuana, he stated he 
believed that he would at least find “some other 
drug”. In Justice Slatter’s opinion that was a sufficient 
subjective belief to support the arrest and the search. 
He also found the officer had objective reasonable 
grounds for the arrest:
 
A pronounced smell of burnt marijuana 
indicates that marijuana was recently consumed 
in the vehicle. Two inferences are possible. It 
could be inferred that the driver of the vehicle 
consumed all the marijuana, so that the smell is 
only indicative of past possession, not present 
possession. On the other hand, it could be 
inferred that the driver did not consume all the 
marijuana, kept some for later consumption, and 
therefore is presently committing the offence of 
possession of a controlled substance. Neither 
inference is intuitively more likely than the 
other, so neither can be said to prevail “on a 
balance of probabilities”. … [H]owever, that is 
not the test. The test is whether it was 
“reasonable” for [the officer] to conclude that 
the [accused] still possessed some marijuana, 
not whether it was more probable than not that 
he did.
 … … …
Here the context of the arrest includes the 
nature, freshness and strength of the smell, the 
large bundle of cash, the giving  of a false name, 
the fact that the [accused] was alone in the car, 
and the location of the police stop halfway 
BY THE BOOK:
Power of Arrest: Criminal Code
s.495(1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, he believes has committed or is about to 
commit an indictable offence,
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal 
offence, or
(c) a person for whose arrest he has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or 
committal, in any form set out in Part XXVIII in 
relation thereto, is in force within the territorial 
jurisdiction in which the person is found.
(2) A peace officer shall not arrest a person without 
warrant for
(a) an indictable offence mentioned in section 553,
(b) an offence for which the person may be 
prosecuted by indictment or for which he is 
punishable on summary conviction, or
(c) an offence punishable on summary conviction,
in any case where
(d) he has reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that the public interest, having regard to all 
the circumstances including the need to
(i) establish the identity of the person,
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating  to the 
offence, or
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the 
offence or the commission of another offence,
may be satisfied without so arresting the person, and
(e) he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if he 
does not so arrest the person, the person will fail to 
attend in court in order to be dealt with according to 
law. 
Volume 10 Issue 6 - November/December 2010
PAGE 11
be tween Edson and 
Edmonton. Some of these 
facts surrounding the 
[accused’s] arrest were 
not necessarily sinister. 
For example, [the officer] 
agreed that there might 
have been an innocent 
explanation for the large 
bundle of money. But 
that does not mean that 
the large bundle of 
money, folded as it was, was not suspicious. 
Finding that money, in the context of the other 
circumstances, contributed to making it 
reasonable to make the arrest. Further, just 
because each circumstance, taken alone, was 
not sufficient to arouse suspicion does not make 
the arrest unreasonable; all of the circumstances 
must be considered collectively, not Piecemeal. 
It is no answer that [the officer] acknowledged 
that each specific thing that he saw could have 
had, in isolation, and innocent explanation. 
[references omitted, paras. 28-30]
 
Furthermore, there were reasonable grounds linking 
the smell of the marijuana to the accused even 
though he showed no signs of impairment and did 
not have the smell on his person or his clothing. He 
was alone in the vehicle and the officer concluded 
from the smell that the marijuana had been smoked 
since the vehicle left its starting  point, Edson. There 
was no evidence that anybody else was in the 
vehicle after it left Edson and any speculation about 
a possible third party being  present did not make the 
officer’s belief unreasonable. The 
accused was also in possession of 
an unusually large bundle of cash. 
These circumstances amounted to 
reasonable grounds supporting  the 
arrest, and the incidental search:
 
It was not necessary for [the 
officer] to have actual proof, or 
belief to a virtual certainty, that 
the [accused] was in possession 
of marijuana at the time of 
arrest. The trial judge’s finding 
that “the officer came to the 
conclusion that the accused was 
currently in possession of 
marijuana, and arrested him for 
this and searched for evidence in a 
search incident to that arrest” 
speaks mostly to the officer’s 
subjective belief. To establish 
objectively reasonable grounds, 
the Crown needed only to show 
that it was objectively reasonable 
to believe that an offence was 
being committed, not that it was 
probable or certain. [para. 32]
 
The smell of burnt marijuana combined with the 
bundle of cash justified an arrest. It was reasonable 
for the officer to believe that an offence was being 
committed, even if that was not necessarily 
“probable”. Even if the circumstances only suggested 
that less than 30 grams of marijuana was involved, 
the smell of marijuana, the giving  of a false name, 
and the other circumstances placed the officer in “a 
situation in which a person is apparently committing 
an offence”. Thus the arrest was lawful under s. 
495(1)(a) or (b) of the Criminal Code.
 
Although a warrantless search is presumed to be 
unlawful, the police have a right to search an 
arrestee and their immediate surroundings upon 
arrest. In doing  so, the police do not require 
reasonable grounds to conduct the search; they only 
need show that what they did was reasonable:
 
When [the officer] decided to arrest the 
[accused] for possession of marijuana he needed 
only to have a reasonable belief that the 
[accused] was then committing 
an offence. To justify the search 
there only had to be “some 
reasonable basis for doing what 
the police officer did”, without 
needing to show it was more 
probable than not that drugs 
would be found. …
 
In this case if there were 
reasonable grounds to arrest the 
[accused], to justify the search 
the Crown need only show that 
it was reasonable for [the 
officer] to check for controlled 
substances. To show that their 
conduct was reasonable, the 
“A search for evidence 
“incidental to the arrest” does 
not become unlawful simply 
because some other type of 
contraband is found in the 
process. So, for example, a 
valid search for marijuana 
does not become unlawful 
simply because another type 
of drug, or a firearm, is 
found.”  
“[J]ust because each 
circumstance, taken alone, was 
not sufficient to arouse suspicion 
does not make the arrest 
unreasonable; all of the 
circumstances must be considered 
collectively, not Piecemeal.”  
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police must demonstrate that the search was 
“truly incidental to the arrest” in the sense that 
there must have been a reasonable prospect of 
securing evidence “of the offence for which the 
accused is being  arrested”. Thus in this case the 
Crown must show that the arrest was lawful and 
it was reasonable to look for controlled 
substances in the car.
 
A search for evidence “incidental to the arrest” 
does not become unlawful simply because some 
other type of contraband is found in the process. 
So, for example, a valid search for marijuana 
does not become unlawful simply because 
another type of drug, or a firearm, is found. The 
search was still “incidental to the arrest”. Once 
[the officer] arrested the [accused] for possession 
it was clearly reasonable to search for drugs in 
the car. The search was lawful and reasonable. 
[references omitted, paras. 35-37]
 
The officer had subjective and objective reasonable 
grounds to believe that the accused was in the 
possession of a controlled substance. The arrest and 
search were therefore lawful.
A Second Opinion: s.495(1)(a) Applied
 
Justice Hunt agreed the accused’s appeal should be 
dismissed, but for different reasons. In her view, the 
police officer had objectively reasonable grounds for 
arresting  the accused under s. 495(1)(a) and that the 
subsequent search was justified. If an officer does 
not have a subjective belief in grounds for arrest the 
arrest will be unlawful. Here the officer testified 
several times that he believed he had grounds to 
arrest for possessing  a controlled substance and the 
accused conceded at trial that this was the case. But 
the officer said he never saw the accused 
committing  an offence, thus the arrest could not be 
justified under s. 495(1)(b) (finds committing  a 
criminal offence). Nevertheless, Justice Hunt was 
satisfied that there was an objective basis to support 
the officer’s subjective belief that he had grounds to 
arrest the accused under s. 495(1)(a) for possessing  a 
controlled substance in an amount exceeding  30 
grams:
 
The officer explained clearly why he concluded 
the marijuana had been smoked within the last 
two hours, during the time that the vehicle 
would have travelled between Edson and 
Wabamun. Since the [accused] was alone in the 
vehicle when stopped for speeding, it was not an 
unreasonable conclusion that the [accused] had 
smoked the marijuana. Even though he did not 
detect the odour of marijuana on the [accused], 
the officer could not recall whether he was ever 
close enough to be able to smell it on him. …He 
also explained that there was a shield between 
him and the [accused] while the [accused] was 
in the back seat of the police vehicle. Thus, his 
failure to smell marijuana on the [accused] does 
not detract from the reasonableness of his 
conclusion that the [accused] had been smoking 
it in the car.
 
The officer candidly acknowledged he would 
not have made the arrest based on odour alone. 
He made the arrest because of the odour 
combined with the large bundle of money 
(nearly $5,500) he found in the [accused’s] 
pocket during  a valid pat-down search for 
reasons of officer safety. Both his evidence, and 
that of the expert ..., explained in detail why this 
amount of cash and its denominations (mainly 
$20 bills) was indicative of drug  trafficking. [The 
expert] testified that most bank machines will 
only issue a maximum of $500 and average 
citizens carry only $100 - $200 cash … While 
the cash was not in $1,000 bundles as is often 
the norm for street-level traffickers, in the 
context of the drug  trade [the expert] had 
encountered, on several occasions, a large 
quantity of cash in various denominations in a 
single bundle.
 
The odour and the cash was sufficient to meet 
the test in Storrey. An objective observer could 
reasonably conclude that someone who was 
smoking marijuana in his car and had a large 
wad of cash in his pocket was involved in the 
drug  trade, and therefore in possession of 
significant amounts of controlled substances.
 
Since there were grounds for the arrest, there 
were also grounds for a search incidental to it. In 
this regard… [the officer] never wavered from 
his belief about the presence of controlled 
substances despite his interchanges with the 
[accused]. Nothing  significant changed in his 
belief between the arrest and the search. [paras. 
47-50]
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Even if there was a Charter breach Justice Hunt 
would have admitted the evidence under s.24(2). 
Any breach was not serious and inadvertent or 
minor, rather than a wilful or reckless disregard of 
the Charter. Plus the officer had acted in good faith. 
The impact on the accused’s Charter  rights was not 
serious, especially since he was driving  a third 
party’s car in which he would have little expectation 
of privacy. Further the truth-seeking  function of the 
criminal trial process would be better served by the 
admission of the evidence. Refusing  to admit the 
evidence would have a negative impact on the 
administration of justice. “Front line police officers 
face an enormously difficult task in trying  to stop the 
flow of illicit drugs,” said Justice Hunt. “The law 
obliges them to deal quickly with possible suspects 
they have detained. Section 10(a) of the Charter, 
requires that a detainee be advised of the reasons for 
arrest or detention ‘promptly’. That obligation may 
sometimes detract from the sort of careful analysis 
about possible Charter breaches that can occur later 
during  a trial or an appeal, when there is unlimited 
time for drawing  fine distinctions and examining 
previous cases.”
A Different View: Neither ss.495(1)(a) or (b) 
Applied
 
Justice Berger disagreed with his colleagues and 
found there were no reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused for possessing  marijuana nor to search his 
vehicle for “other drugs” that resulted in the seizure 
of the cocaine. He noted that the officer, with 27 
years experience, was no stranger to the criminal 
courts:
 
Given his experience, one would reasonably 
expect [the officer] to be both well-versed in and 
mindful of the Charter imperatives governing his 
investigative actions. He is deemed to know that 
he has no authority to arrest a 
citizen on a “hunch” that a crime 
has been committed. That is not to 
say that a policeman’s intuitive 
sense, honed over many years of 
policing, should be ignored as the 
investigator chooses his or her 
course of action. There is but one 
overarching  requirement: that 
course must be lawful and compliant with the 
Charter. [para. 59]
 
Here, the officer acknowledged that the smell of 
burnt marijuana tends to linger and that the most 
that could be said is that the marijuana had been 
smoked within several hours of the stop:
 
The Crown concedes that in order for the smell 
of marijuana to be a persuasive factor in 
assessing grounds for arrest, the arresting  officer 
must convince the court that the odour which he 
smelled was, indeed, marijuana. Further, that the 
circumstances surrounding  the arrest must 
indicate present rather than past possession. Of 
course, the difficulty with olfactory evidence is 
that the smell of marijuana may indicate nothing 
more than past possession. In that event, absent 
an admission, the amount possessed will be 
unascertainable. Pursuant to s. 495(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code, an investigating officer is not 
entitled to arrest without warrant a person who 
may have been but is not found in simple 
possession of marijuana in an amount not 
exceeding thirty grams, the latter being  a 
summary conviction offence. Past possession of 
thirty grams or less will not suffice.
 
At no time did [the officer] testify that he 
believed that the [accused] was in possession of 
a controlled substance exceeding 30 grams. Nor 
could he - after all, he did not find the [accused] 
in possession of any drug. Moreover, when 
questioned about the significance of the money, 
[the officer] said nothing  from which it can be 
reasonably inferred that he suspected trafficking. 
The factual underpinnings do not support the 
invocation and application of s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code. [paras. 67-68]
 
In Justice Berger’s view the circumstances of this 
case, including  the smell of burnt marijuana and the 
cash found in the accused’s pocket, did not provide 
reasonable grounds to arrest for possessing 
marijuana. The arrest was therefore 
arbitrary and unlawful. As for the 
search there was no valid purpose 
connected to the arrest. He likened 
the search for other drugs to a 
search premised upon a hunch or 
mere intuition or based on the 
nervousness of the accused:
“[T]he difficulty with 
olfactory evidence is that 
the smell of marijuana may 
indicate nothing more than 
past possession.”  
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One can well appreciate [the officer’s] desire to 
find out what was in the duffle bag  that he first 
noticed when he approached the vehicle. 
Curiosity, even when motivated by an intention 
to expose criminal conduct, must yield to 
Charter imperatives. In the instant case, the 
factual underpinnings do not, in my opinion, 
establish reasonable grounds to search the 
vehicle. They do not meet the test of securing 
evidence of the offence for which the accused 
was arrested nor for the search for “other 
drugs” [para. 80]
 
Justice Berger found neither the arrest nor the search 
for evidence were valid and the evidence was 
inadmissible under s. 24(2). He would have allowed 
the appeal, quashed the accused’s conviction, and 
substituted an acquittal.
Bases on the majority opinions, the accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
JUDICIAL NOTICE ON GENERAL 
LOCATION OF CELL PHONE OK
R. v. Ranger & Fijalkowski, 2010 ONCA 759
T h e a c c u s e d s , R a n g e r a n d 
Fijalkowski, were convicted of a 
number of serious offences arising 
out of a home invasion motivated by 
the mistaken belief that the home 
owners were operating  a marijuana "grow op" and 
had a great deal of cash in the home. As part of the 
Crown’s case, business records were entered on 
consent detailing  the operation of various cell 
phones owned by the accuseds and one of the 
accomplices, and the cell phone tower to which the 
signal from a particular phone was transmitted in 
respect of each call. An Ontario Superior Court 
judge, without expert evidence, took judicial notice 
of the approximate location of a cell phone at the 
time a particular call was made based on the cell 
phone tower that received the signal. Similarly, he 
plotted the directional movement of a cell phone 
over a particular time period by referring  to the 
location of the different cell phone towers that 
received signals from the cell phone during  that time 
period. 
The accuseds appealed, contending, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in taking  judicial notice that certain 
cell phones were being  operated in various 
geographical locations at different times without 
hearing  expert evidence. But the Ontario Court of 
Appeal rejected this argument. The trial judge used 
the cell phone evidence for very limited purposes - 
to show association among  the parties and the 
approximate geographical location of the cell 
phones in relation to the cell phone tower that 
received the transmission. “[The judge] did not take 
judicial notice that the cell phone was in any precise 
location, but rather that it could properly be placed 
in a general location,” said the Court of Appeal. “The 
trial judge's further inference with respect to the 
movement of the cell phones over a given period of 
time followed from his determination that judicial 
notice could be taken of the general location of the 
cell phone based on the cell phone tower that 
received a particular transmission.” Cell phone users 
engaged in a cell phone call and travelling  from 
point A to point B will find their cell phone signal 
passes from one cell phone tower to another at 
different locations along  the route. Thus, the trial 
judge could take judicial notice that a particular cell 
phone was in a general location based on the tower 
that received the signal and the path along  which 
the cell phone was moving  could be determined by 
reference to the cell phone towers that received the 
signal transmission in respect of particular calls. Plus 
Crown was seeking  to use the cell phone evidence 
only to show the approximate location of the users 
and their movement in a certain direction between 
locations. If, however, the Crown wanted to rely on 
this kind of evidence for more specific or precise 
inferences an expert was required.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“I believe that everyone has within  themselves the 
power to make this a better world.” - Lone Ranger
www.10-8.ca
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LAWFULLY OBTAINED DNA 
USEABLE IN SUBSEQUENT 
UNRELATED INVESTIGATION
R. v. DeJesus, 2010 ONCA 581
Four months after the brutal murder 
of a woman in an office building, the 
accused, who had previously worked 
as a janitor in the building, was 
charged with her murder. As part of 
the Crown’s case, the police used the accused’s 
DNA which was on file as a result of an earlier, 
separate police investigation of three sexual assault 
charges, one of which he pled guilty. This DNA had 
been found on the accused’s underwear which was 
seized as an incident to lawful arrest. Using  this 
DNA evidence, obtained seven years earlier, the 
police were able to establish the identity of the killer 
in this new murder. The semen found on the victim’s 
jeans could not be excluded as coming  from the 
accused; the probability of it coming  from someone 
else was 1 in 670 billion. Furthermore, saliva found 
on her underwear could not be excluded as coming 
from the accused; the probability of it coming  from 
someone else was 1 in 65,000. As well, when the 
accused was arrested he was in possession of a 
knife, knife sheath, and handcuffs. DNA profiles 
from the knife sheath and handcuffs matched the 
victim’s DNA. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
found that using  the earlier DNA, obtained from the 
accused’s underwear, did not violate s. 8  of the 
Charter. He was convicted by a jury of first degree 
murder.
The accused then challenged this ruling  to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, but his appeal was 
rejected. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge. “Once the [accused] was convicted of sexual 
assault with a weapon,” said the Court, “his privacy 
with respect to identifying  information was 
significantly diminished.” Here, the previous DNA 
information was obtained as an incident to lawful 
arrest under the common law. It had been lawfully 
obtained and retained by the police. And there was 
no policy reason to prevent the police from using  the 
DNA for comparison purposes in subsequent 
unrelated investigations, especially where the 
accused was convicted for the offence under which 
the DNA was lawfully seized. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DOG SNIFF UNLAWFUL: OFFICER 
LACKED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION
R. v. Payette, 2010 BCCA 392
The accused, driving  alone on a 
highway, was stopped at a random 
traffic checkpoint. A qualified dog 
handler and his drug  detecting 
police service dog  were also present 
at the location. The accused gave his licence and 
registration to an experienced traffic enforcement 
officer. Based on the following  observations, the 
officer asked the dog  handler to conduct a walk-
around sniff search of the vehicle with the dog:
1. The vehicle was a newer model Volvo owned by 
a third party and accordingly the driver was not 
the owner of the vehicle;
2. He was the lone occupant in the vehicle;
3. He was unshaven and wearing a dark hoodie.
4. The vehicle, by the debris of water and coffee 
containers in the vehicle and on the passenger 
side appeared to be “lived in”. There were also 
food wrappers from Tim Horton to suggest he 
was hitting “drive through” establishments;
5. He was pale and his head was shaking; and
6. There was a radar detector in the vehicle.
The dog  indicated the presence of drugs in the 
vehicle and the accused was arrested. The car was 
searched and a suitcase containing  34 one-pound 
bags of marihuana was found in the trunk.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
judge found the random traffic stop was lawful. It 
was conducted for traffic safety purposes and not to 
undertake a drug  investigation or for some ulterior 
purpose. He noted the dog  sniff constituted a search 
and therefore the police required a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal drug  activity before the dog 
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was deployed. The officer had extensive experience 
in motor vehicle investigations and his observations 
supported his decision to for a sniff search of the 
vehicle. Although none of the 
observations taken alone would 
provide a reasonable suspicion for 
deploying  the drug  detector dog, when 
taken together they were sufficient to 
establish a reasonable suspicion that 
the accused was involved in drug-
related criminal activity. The positive 
hit by the drug  dog  then provided 
reasonable grounds to believe the 
accused was committing  a drug 
offence and, therefore, his arrest was 
lawful and the drugs were found 
during  a search conducted incidental 
to arrest. There was no Charter breach under s. 8, 
the evidence was admitted, and the accused was 
convicted of possessing  marihuana for the purposes 
of trafficking  under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act.
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal. He challenged the trial judge’s 
application of the “reasonable suspicion” standard, 
rather than “reasonable and probable grounds”, in 
deciding  the drug  detector dog  search at a traffic 
checkpoint was lawful. Furthermore, he argued that 
the trial judge erred in determining  that the 
reasonable suspicion standard was even satisfied in 
this case and, because of this s. 8 Charter  violation, 
the evidence should have been   excluded under s. 
24(2).
Reasonable suspicion v. reasonable & 
probable grounds
The accused submitted that the reasonable suspicion 
standard was insufficient to justify the drug  dog  sniff 
in this case. Unlike sniff searches at a public bus 
terminal or a high school that are part of an ongoing 
criminal investigation, the sniff search occurring 
here was  at a roadside traffic stop involving  an 
arbitrary detention permitted only for the specific 
purpose of road safety, not for conducting  criminal 
investigations. In his view, a high standard, such as 
reasonable grounds for belief, was needed. But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed. “The characteristics of a 
sniffer dog  search … are no different in the context 
of a roadside traffic stop than in a bus station or 
school,” said Justice Neilson, 
speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal.  “The trial judge 
p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d t h e 
reasonable suspicion standard 
in determining  whether the 
drug  detector dog  was lawfully 
deployed in this case.”
However, the Court of Appeal 
ruled that the trial judge erred 
in finding  that the standard of 
reasonable suspicion was 
satisfied in the circumstances 
of this case. The standard of reasonable suspicion 
has both an objective and a subjective component. 
In assessing  the objective component it is the 
cumulative import or collective effect of the factors 
that determines whether there is an objectively 
reasonable basis for the suspicion. These factors 
must also be viewed in the context of an officer’s 
background and experience in determining  whether 
there were sufficient grounds existing  to support a 
reasonable suspicion. In this case, the standard to be 
reached was that the officer reasonably suspected 
the accused was involved in drug-related criminal 
activity which would then permit a search using  a 
drug detector dog.
But here, the Court of Appeal concluded the six 
factors relied on by the officer were not capable of 
providing  the required objectively discernible nexus 
between the accused and illegal drug activity:
Each of those factors taken on its own is 
innocuous and characteristic of many citizens 
driving  the highways. [The officer] admitted as 
much. He conceded the [accused’s] beard and 
the fact he wore a hoodie were not noteworthy. 
He agreed a driver stopped by the police could 
be nervous for reasons unrelated to drug  activity. 
He acknowledged that radar detectors are 
generally and legally used by the public to avoid 
speeding infractions, but said in his experience 
drug couriers also use them to keep track of 
police presence along the highways. He agreed 
the [accused] was not the only driver who was 
“While ... the objective 
reasonableness requirement 
must be viewed in the light of 
the investigating officer’s 
background and experience, 
deference to an officer’s 
intuition must not render the 
objective element of the 
inquiry meaningless.”  
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stopped at the road check with food wrappers in 
his car, but said that, in his experience, those 
transporting drugs typically obtain food at drive-
through restaurants so they do not have to leave 
their vehicles unattended. He also said his 
experience led him to believe that people with a 
record or outstanding  charges related to drugs 
often drive another person’s vehicle to avoid 
rais ing suspicion on a vehicle check. 
Nevertheless, vehicles are commonly driven by 
people other than their owners for a multitude of 
reasons. [para. 23]
So even though the officer did not rely on each 
factor individually as the basis for ordering  the sniff 
search, but considered the cumulative picture they 
presented in the context of his 18 years’ experience 
as a police officer, the six factors taken together 
were not capable of providing  grounds for any 
objective suspicion of criminal drug  activity. “While 
I appreciate the objective reasonableness 
requirement must be viewed in the light of the 
investigating  officer’s background and experience,” 
said Justice Neilson, “deference to an officer’s 
intuition must not render the objective element of 
the inquiry meaningless.” The Court of Appeal found 
the officer “ordered the search solely on subjective 
intuition born of his experience.”
Plus the officer testified he did not have sufficient 
grounds to detain the accused for investigation once 
the checks on his vehicle and driver’s licence were 
completed. The standard of reasonable suspicion for 
investigative detention was the same as that for a 
drug  detector dog  search in this case. The purpose of 
further detention or a sniff search would both have 
been to investigate drug  activity. The reasonable 
suspicion required to justify each would therefore 
have been identical. The officer’s own evidence 
supported the view that he was uncertain as to 
whether he had met the standard of reasonable 
suspicion. Thus, the sniff search was unlawful and 
breached the accused’s rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter.
s.24(2) Charter
Using  the revised s. 24(2) analysis the evidence was 
excluded.
• the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct. The Charter breach did not result from a 
wilful or flagrant disregard of the accused’s rights, 
but it was not inadvertent either. Its seriousness 
fell in the mid-range of seriousness.
• the impact of the breach  on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused. The accused’s 
privacy interest in the contents of his car while 
travelling  on a public road was lower than the 
privacy interest attached to his home or office. 
"Nevertheless, he and the rest of the travelling 
public have a significant interest in being  free to 
drive on public roads without being  subject to 
unlawful vehicle searches,” said Justice Neilson. 
“This interest is heightened at traffic safety 
checkpoints, which already amount to arbitrary 
detentions and are justifiable only because of the 
public interest in keeping  roads safe.” The nature 
of the search, however, was brief and non-
intrusive and solely targeted the presence of 
illegal drugs.
• society's interest in  the adjudication of the case 
on  its merits. The marihuana seized was highly 
reliable, real evidence, and essential to the 
Crown’s case. But the unlawful state conduct 
weighed heavily against exclusion:
The public interest in not being subjected to 
unlawful vehicle searches while arbitrarily 
detained at roadside stops supports exclusion 
of the evidence. On the other hand … I am 
persuaded [the officer’s] conduct is mediated 
somewhat by the fact that at the time of these 
events there was disagreement as to whether 
sniff searches constituted a s. 8 search at all…
I find this a close call but conclude that 
admission of the marihuana seized from the 
[accused’s] vehicle in evidence against him 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute. [paras. 45-46]
The marihuana was not admissible, the accused’s 
appeal was allowed, and his conviction was set 
aside.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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Conference keynote speakers include ...
General Rick Hillier (Ret)
Rick Hillier's passion, 
leadership and outspoken 
nature have captured the 
hearts and minds of 
Canadians across the 
country. A man who takes 
pride in his country, his 
team and the significance 
of his mission, General 
Hillier is one of Canada's 
most celebrated leaders.
Hillier tells it like it is - with confidence and a 
straight-talking  manner. As Chief of the Defence 
Staff, Canada's highest ranking  position in the 
Canadian Forces, he oversaw our country's most 
important mission in Afghanistan. Since retiring  from 
that role, he's become more active in business and 
community programs, as organizations see the value 
in learning  from and engaging  with such a strong 
leader, motivator and team builder as Rick Hillier.
Considered one of Canada's most charismatic and 
influential soldiers, General Rick Hillier will 
challenge convention and inspire pride in being 
Canadian, all while sharing  his trademark 
Newfoundland charm and humour.
Gordon Scobbie
Assistant Chief Constable, 
West Midlands Police, UK, 
S o c i a l M e d i a L e a d , 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police Officers (ACPO) "UK 
Policing  2.0. - The Citizen 
and Digital Engagement"
Gordon joined Strathclyde Police in 1980, serving 
operationally in uniform and CID through the ranks, 
as well as in other areas of the business including 
Force Personnel, introducing  a national performance 
appraisal system for Scotland and being  the first 
police force in the UK to achieve accreditation for 
investors in people. He then served for 3 years at the 
Scottish Police College delivering  leadership training 
before returning  to force to establish a disclosure 
bureau to provide conviction and non conviction 
information on those wishing  to work with children 
and vulnerable adults.
He then served as an operational Chief Inspector 
before transferring  to West Midlands Police on 
promotion in October 2004 as Superintendent, 
Operations Manager at Coventry City Centre . He 
was then promoted to Commander at Solihull in 
August 2006 and following  completion of the 
Strategic Command Course he was successful in his 
application to join West Midlands Police as Assistant 
Chief Constable. Gordon has been in post since 
June 2009, holding the Citizen Focus portfolio. 
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APRIL 11-13, 2011
For more information and to register:
www.policeleadershipconference.com
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General, and the Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership conference. This 
police leadership conference will provide an opportunity for delegates to hear 
leadership topics discussed by world-renowned speakers. 
Register Today
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Rex Murphy
Rex Murphy is one of 
Canada's most respected 
opinion leaders. His witty 
intellect and profound 
i n s i g h t i n t o i s s u e s 
affecting  Canadians are 
the reasons why they tune 
in regularly to his weekly 
CBC radio show, Cross Country Checkup, watch him 
on CBC TV's The National, and read his column in 
The National Post. He has a unique ability to 
examine a topic and articulate it in the most 
profound yet digestible way. Murphy's audiences 
become so engaged they don't even realize it's 
happening.
Cross Country Checkup is Canada's only national 
open-line radio program, broadcast live across the 
nation every Sunday afternoon. Each week, Murphy 
moderates a lively discussion on an issue of national 
interest or importance and invites listeners to call in 
with their opinions and thoughts.
Rex Murphy is a stimulating  speaker, accomplished 
storyteller, and knows what makes Canadians tick. 
His innate ability to speak on a variety of topics 
makes him a great fit for anyone looking  for a fresh 
and honest perspective on the issues facing  them 
today. Each speech made by Murphy is customized 
to your topic and audience.
Plus Ryan Walters, David  Kennedy and Julian 
Fantino.
Banquet Dinner Entertainment
Ron James
Stand-up comedian and host of 
The Ron James Show on CBC.
One of this country's most 
p o p u l a r a n d t r e a s u r e d 
comedians, Ron James has been 
called "more Canadian than 
warm mitts on a radiator," by 
Rick Mercer, and "devastatingly 
funny and clever" by The Globe 
and Mail. A straight-talking  stand up from the East 
Coast, James has honed his unique brand of 
intellectual everyman comedy for the past thirty 
years. In 2009, after a string  of hit CBC specials, he 
launched his own CBC variety show, The Ron James 
Show, which quickly became the network's biggest 
new comedy show in years. 
Prior to hosting  his own CBC show, Ron James spent 
nine years with Second City, and starred in several 
CBC specials, including  Quest for the West and The 
Road Between My Ears, which is the CBC's 
bestselling  comedy DVD. His specials routinely 
draw nearly a million viewers. He's been nominated 
for a Genie Award, won a Gemini as part of the 
writing  team on This Hour Has 22 Minutes, and was 
voted the inaugural Canadian Comedian of the Year. 
James was also the only comedian invited to 
perform when Conan O'Brien brought his Late Night 
show to Canada. 
Simply put, Ron James is one of the funniest, most 
kinetically charged comedians this country has 
produced. With rapid-fire jokes and a poet's 
sensitivity to language, his stand-up sets may be the 
best gauge going  for what it means to be Canadian 
and what it feels like to live with a unique brand of 
self-awareness that is shared, coast to coast, by over 
30 million people. Razor-sharp, clean, and 
accessible, James cuts a wide swath through 
contemporary culture. He draws belly laughs, elicits 
chin-scratching  flashes of insight, and collects 
rapturous ovations by telling  stories from across 
Canada. Some of the stories are about him; but 
mostly, they're about us.
REGISTRATION
The registration fee for the Police 
Leadership 2011 Conference is $385 (plus 
applicable taxes). The registration cut off 
date is March 21, 2011. 
The conference fee includes a reception on 
Monday evening, lunches on Tuesday and 
Wednesday, and a banquet dinner on 
Tuesday. Each participant will receive a 
"welcome package" upon registration. 
Register early, as the number of delegates 
are limited and past conferences have sold 
out prior to the registration cut-off date. 
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Advanced Strategic 
Communications Seminar
Social Media and Policing in the Digital Age
With the introduction of Social Media networks, 
how people get information has changed forever. 
There is no longer a single source of accurate 
information. People are relying  on their peers for 
information and trusting  what they learn online 
rather than traditional media or corporations. Social 
media is fast, interactive, unrestricted, and free-
wheeling. It has democratized communication. It 
has also changed policing. 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are not only ways to 
deliver information about the police agency but also 
an effective investigative tool and key in operational 
strategies. However, the policing  world has to 
manage the competing  interests of security, 
reputation, privacy, and public interest.
The Advanced Strategic Communications Seminar is 
a two-day pre-conference workshop that will bring 
social media pioneers to speak about how to tap 
into this technology and how to develop social 
media strategies that can be adapted to the policing 
environment.
When: April 10-11 
Where: Westin Bayshore, Vancouver, BC
Cost: $585 plus HST
Space is limited to 200 participants
Speakers and Topics
Della Smith, Q Workshops Inc.
“Social Media: Promise or Peril”
Tim Burrows, Toronto Police Service
“Media Relations Officer”
Ron "Cook" Barrett, Capitol Region Gang  Prevention 
Center
“Gang Prevention Specialist for NY”
David Toddington, Toddington International Inc.
“Social Media Intelligence Gathering”
 Kim Bolan, The Vancouver Sun
“The Real Scoop Blog on Crime”
Assistant Chief Constable Gordon Scobbie
West Midlands Police, UK
“UK Policing  2.0 - The Citizen and Digital 
Engagement”
 Mary Lynn Youn, UBC School of Journalism
“Canada's Media is Changing in a Digital Age”
Chris Gailus, Global TV
“Anchor 6:00 News”
Kyle Friesen, DOJ
“Risks and Pitfalls”
Eric Weaver, DDB Canada Advertising
“Social Marketing: A Profound Cultural Shift”
Delegates are responsible for booking their own rooms.  The Westin Bayshore has a block of rooms reserved for 
the Police Leadership 2011 Conference delegates. Reservations should be made by requesting the "Police 
Leadership Conference" rate. This room rate is being held until March 17, 2011. Book early as the conference rate 
can only be guaranteed for this block of rooms. If you want more information on the hotel and amenities, you can 
visit the hotel website at www.westinbayshore.com. 
In addition, to the conference dates of April 11th to 13th, 2011, the Westin Bayshore has extended conference 
rates from April 9 to 17, 2011 for those delegates who want to extend their stay either before or after the 
conference and enjoy the conference rates extended to Police Leadership 2008 Conference delegates only. Rates 
are $180 in the main building and $182 in the tower (based on single occupancy).
The Westin Bayshore, Vancouver, British Columbia 
HOTEL FAX: (604) 691-6980
HOTEL TELEPHONE: (604) 682-3377
TOLL FREE 1 800 WESTIN 1 
E-MAIL: bayshorereservations@westin.com
HOTEL RESERVATIONS
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4:1 PRE-TRIAL CUSTODY CREDIT 
GRANTED FOR CHARTER 
BREACH
R. v. Rashid 2010 ONCA 591
The accused was found guilty in the 
Ontario Court of Justice for assaulting 
his wife and son during  a domestic 
incident occurring  in their home. 
Following  the guilty finding, the 
accused made an application under s. 24(1) of the 
Charter for a stay of proceedings on the basis that 
his rights under s. 9 of the Charter had been 
breached. The police had an unwritten policy of 
automatic and routine detention of all persons 
charged with domestic violence until they attended 
a bail hearing  before a judicial officer. Police did not 
consider releasing  persons charged with domestic 
violence under to s. 498  of the Criminal Code. The 
trial judge stated:
[The officer] never gave at the time consideration 
to the factors in s. 498  (1.1) either personally or 
through an Officer in Charge to form any 
personal, subjective belief that [the accused’s] 
detention was necessary
This, in the judge’s view, was a systemic abdication 
of legal responsibility by the police. The judge did 
not impose a stay of proceedings as the accused 
requested. Instead he enhanced credit for pre-trial 
custody on a 4 for 1 basis.  The accused was 
sentenced to 21 days in custody, to be served 
intermittently, followed by 2 years probation. His 
appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was 
dismissed.
The accused then challenged the trial judge’s refusal 
to stay the charges to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Although the Crown did not contest the finding  of 
the Charter breach nor the denunciation of the 
police policy, Ontario’s top court stated:
The trial judge in this case applied the proper 
legal principles and exercised his discretion to 
craft a remedy that appropriately addressed the 
circumstances of the breaches and the public 
and individual interests at stake.  ...
In refusing leave, we should not be taken to be 
minimizing the importance of Charter principles 
regarding the granting of pre-trial release.  
However, this issue was addressed by the courts 
below. Specifically, with respect to the ... Police 
Services Policy, there was clear recognition that 
this systemic policy led to a serious Charter 
breach and clear judicial denunciation of the 
practice.
The summary conviction appeal judge 
concluded that the denunciation of the ... Police 
Services detention practice together with the 
enhanced credit for pre-trial custody properly 
addressed the seriousness of the breach.  The 
summary conviction appeal judge then went on 
to state that “[i]t is strongly urged that the policy 
of routine detention of those charged with 
d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e b e i m m e d i a t e l y 
terminated.” [pars. 6-8]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
WARRANTS UNDER DIFFERENT 
PROVISIONS, FOR DIFFERENT 
PURPOSES & DIFFERENT ITEMS, 
NOT ‘SIMULTANEOUS’
R. v. Black, 2010 NBCA 65
 
Following  a drug  and proceeds of 
crime investigation code named 
“Opera t ion Jackpo t ” , po l i ce 
obtained two search warrants to be 
executed during  the same hours. The 
first search warrant was issued by a Provincial Court 
judge under s. 487 of the Criminal Code. It 
authorized the police to search the accused’s 
residence for various documents, including  invoices, 
cancelled cheques, deposit slips, withdrawal slips, 
cheque books and ledgers. The second search 
warrant was issued by a Court of Queen’s Bench 
judge under s. 462.32 of the Criminal Code (special 
search warrant - proceeds of crime) It authorized a 
search for a Chevrolet pick-up truck, a Chevrolet 
Camaro, Snowmobiles and Seadoos owned by the 
accused. Several individuals were arrested, 
including  the accused. Following  his trial in New 
Brunswick Provincial Court, the accused was 
convicted of several drug  counts related to the 
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production and sale of marijuana, as well as 
conspiracy to launder, conspiracy to possess 
property or proceeds of crime, laundering  the 
proceeds of crime, and possessing  property knowing 
it was obtained by crime. In addition to sentences of 
incarceration, the trial judge ordered forfeiture of the 
criminal proceeds. 
The accused challenged his conviction to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
warrants were issued “simultaneously” and, as such, 
constituted an “abuse of process” requiring  they 
both be quashed. But Justice Bell, speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal, disagreed. Warrants to be executed 
at the same time and the same premises are not 
necessarily, by definition, “simultaneous”. Rather, “a 
simultaneous warrant is one issued for purposes of 
searching  the same premises for the same items in 
circumstances where the validity of the first one has 
not yet been decided.”  Justice Bell stated:
 
Each warrant in this case had a distinct purpose.  
The purpose of the general warrant (s. 487) was 
to authorize a search for documents that would 
afford evidence of an offence.  The purpose of 
the special warrant (s. 462.32) was to authorize 
a search for motor vehicles, vessels and 
snowmobiles that might eventually be subject to 
forfeiture in the event the accused was found 
guilty of a designated offence.  Because the 
second warrant was issued under a different 
provision of the Code, for different purposes and 
for different items, it could not, in any 
circumstance, have been considered a 
“simultaneous” warrant as contemplated by the 
jurisprudence. [references omitted, para. 10]
Even if there is a finding  that a warrant has been 
issued “simultaneously” both need not be quashed; 
only the second warrant will fall. Here, Justice Bell 
would not have reversed the trial judge for failing  to 
quash the second warrant even if had been issued 
“simultaneously”. Remedies will only be fashioned 
for abuse of the court’s process in the clearest of 
cases and judicial intervention is warranted only 
when the conduct shocks the conscience of the 
community and is detrimental to the interests of 
justice.  In this case there was “nothing  about the 
circumstances surrounding  the issuance of the 
warrants that demonstrate[d] any bad faith or 
improper motive on the part of the police,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “There [was] no evidence of 
anything  that would shock the conscience of the 
community.”
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO SEARCH WHEN 
UNDERCOVER OFFICER INVITED 
INSIDE TO VIEW BUY MONEY
R. v. Roy, 2010 BCCA 448
The police engaged in an elaborate 
reverse sting  operation to obtain 
evidence against a cr iminal 
organization.  It required police to 
engage in what would otherwise be 
criminal activity by selling  drugs to those targeted. In 
doing  so, police enlisted the assistance of an agent 
who had infiltrated the organization. While 
executing  their plan, police were led to the accused, 
who was not known to them and therefore had not 
been an original target.  Contact with the accused 
was made through two intermediaries, who were 
shown marihuana by the police and the sale of 100 
pounds for $160,000 was negotiated.  The police 
asked to see the money before making  arrangements 
to conclude the sale, but the accused refused to 
leave his home with the money.  He invited the 
police to go to his home and see the money 
there.  The agent was taken to the home by the 
intermediaries and was shown a substantial amount 
of cash.  The following  afternoon, a police officer, 
still posing  as a drug  dealer, was taken to the home 
by one of the intermediaries.  The accused invited 
him in, showed him $135,000 in a box and told him 
that another $35,000 or $40,000 was available at 
the premises. The accused then took the officer to a 
nearby building  and showed him quantities of 
harvested marihuana as indicative of the quality he 
expected.  The officer then signalled for an arrest 
team waiting  nearby. The accused was arrested and 
the home and grounds were secured by the police 
They went through the house and garage looking  for 
people who could destroy evidence or cause the 
police harm.  It took about five minutes to clear the 
house and two minutes to clear the garage. A search 
warrant was subsequently obtained and  executed.
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At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court, the 
accused argued that his s. 8 Charter rights were 
breached when the police, acting  undercover as 
drug  dealers, deceived him as to their identity in 
order to gain entry into his home for the purpose of 
seeing  and seizing  money which he had told them 
he would use to buy marihuana they offered to sell 
him. In the trial judge’s view, however, the accused’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy had not been 
breached. Thus there could be no unreasonable 
search or seizure. The accused had invited 
undercover agents onto his property for the express 
purpose of viewing  the purchase money and it could 
not be expected that they would reveal themselves 
before taking  up the invitation.  No warrant was 
required because of this express invitation. The 
application to exclude evidence was dismissed and 
the accused was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in 
marihuana and possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.  
The accused challenged the trial judge’s ruling  to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, contending, 
among  other grounds, that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his home and that it was 
reasonable for him to expect that the police would 
not enter upon his property for the purpose of seeing 
and seizing  the purchase money without valid 
judicial authority. In his view, the invitation he 
extended to the undercover officer was obtained 
through deception and he knew nothing  of its 
consequences. Therefore he maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home which 
was not validly waived and the subsequent 
warrantless search was conducted in the absence of 
any exigent circumstances.
Justice Lowry, authoring  the unanimous British 
Columbia Court of Appeal judgment, disagreed with 
the accused. When examining  a s. 8  Charter 
challenge, there are two distinct questions to be 
answered:
1. did the accused had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy? “A reasonable expectation of an accused 
person’s privacy must be determined based on 
the totality of the circumstances and may include 
consideration of factors such as the accused’s 
presence at the time of the search, possession or 
control of the property searched, the existence of 
a subjective expectation of privacy and the 
objective reasonableness of that expectation.”
2. if the accused did have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, was the search an unreasonable 
intrusion on that right to privacy? 
Waiver
The Court first distinguished between a person 
waiving  their expectation of privacy in the sense of 
abandoning  it and waiving  their constitutional right 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. In 
the former it is through the actions of the accused 
that alters the scope of their expectation of privacy, 
such as placing  household trash at one’s property 
line for disposal. There is no longer an expectation 
of privacy and therefore there can be no 
unreasonable search or seizure.  In the latter, an 
otherwise unreasonable search or seizure becomes 
permissible because the accused has consented to 
it. For example, where a person is asked to consent 
to a search of trash while it is still located within 
their home, they are essentially being  asked to 
consent to an otherwise unconstitutional search and, 
thus, to waive the constitutional right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure.  In this 
case, the question was whether the accused, by his 
actions, waived or abandoned his expectation of 
privacy such that no s. 8 search or seizure 
occurred. There was no question of whether he was 
waiving  a constitutional right by consenting  to an 
unlawful search and seizure.   
Although generally, a person’s private residence is a 
place where a reasonable expectation of privacy will 
arise there are limits to this general proposition. A 
person, by their actions, may alter the reasonable 
expectation of privacy they may have in their 
residence. Here, the undercover officer attended the 
accused’s residence for the purpose of concluding  a 
drug  transaction.  The accused refused to complete 
the transaction by allowing  police to view the 
purchase money in any location other than his 
private residence.  In so doing, he converted his 
residence to a place of business and thus altered his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. The 
invitation to approach the accused’s residence for 
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the purpose of completing  the drug  transaction was 
an express invitation to enter his home and observe 
the purchase money:
So long  as the police act in accordance with the 
express invitation, they cannot be said to intrude 
upon the privacy interests of the occupant. Here, 
the express invitation authorized the undercover 
officer to enter the [accused’s] home, to view the 
purchase money and to observe the harvested 
marihuana in the garage. At no time did the 
undercover officer’s actions exceed the limits of 
this invitation.   As a result, no violation of any 
privacy interest of the [accused] can be said to 
have occurred.  [para. 31]
Nor did the police exceed the accused’s invitation to 
view the purchase money by virtue of their ulterior 
purpose of collecting  evidence against him. This was 
different from the situation where police, relying  on 
implied invitation to knock, have two purposes for 
approaching  an accused’s door – (1) to speak with 
the accused and (2) to conduct a search by sniffing 
the air for marihuana. Only the first purpose is 
authorized by the implied invitation to knock and an 
infringement can occur because the police pursued 
the unauthorized purpose of searching  for 
marihuana. Here, the accused is complaining  about 
how the police chose to use the information they 
obtained through pursuing  an authorized purpose.  
“Police do not require authorization to use 
information they properly obtain through 
undercover operations,” said Justice Lowry:
In the absence of the [accused] having 
established that the police violated the 
reasonable expectation of privacy that, in the 
absence of his express invitation, he would have 
had, there was no s. 8  search and seizure 
conducted.  It follows that it is then unnecessary 
to go on to the second stage of the analysis and 
consider whether any search or seizure was 
unreasonable. [para. 33]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Sometimes you cannot believe what you see, you 
have to believe what you feel.” - Morrie Schwartz
NO RIGHT TO LAWYER IN 
INTERROGATION ROOM
R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35
The accused was arrested for murder 
and advised of his right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay, that 
he could call any lawyer he wanted, 
and that a Legal Aid lawyer would 
be available free of charge. He was transported to 
the police detachment where he twice spoke by 
telephone in private with a lawyer of his choice, 
each time for about three minutes. Later he was 
interviewed by a police officer. Before the interview 
began, the officer confirmed with the accused that 
he had been advised of and had exercised his right 
to counsel. He was also warned that he did not have 
to say anything  and that the interview was being 
recorded and could be used in court. During  the five 
hour interview the accused stated on four or five 
occasions that he did not want to talk to the officer, 
wished to speak with his lawyer again, and wanted 
his lawyer present during  the interview. However, 
the officer deflected the requests, advising  the 
accused that he did not have the right to have his 
counsel present, and continued with the 
questioning, gradually revealing  more of the 
evidence against the accused as the interview wore 
on. Eventually, the accused implicated himself in the 
victim’s death, stating  he hit him over the head with 
a frying  pan, stabbed him several times, slit his 
throat, and disposed of the body in a dumpster. 
Later, the police placed him into a cell with an 
undercover officer where he made similar 
incriminating  statements. the accused also 
accompanied the police to where the victim had 
been killed and participated in a re-enactment.
 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
statements during  the interview, the exchange with 
the undercover officer, and the re-enactment were 
proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
trial judge also found there were no s. 10(b) Charter 
breaches and the statements were admitted. A 
conviction for manslaughter followed. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, 
finding  an arrestee had  no right to terminate 
questioning  by asserting  a desire to again speak with 
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a lawyer. The accused then 
appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, again 
arguing  that s. 10(b) imposed 
a duty on police to stop 
questioning  a detainee who 
had already exercised their 
right to counsel but wanted to 
talk to a lawyer again. Further, 
he also argued that s. 10(b) required police , at the 
detainee’s request, to have counsel present during  a 
custodial interrogation.
 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron, co-
authoring  the five member majority opinion, 
dismissed the accused’s appeal. The majority found 
that an initial warning, coupled with a reasonable 
opportunity to consult counsel when the detainee 
invokes the right, will satisfy s. 10(b) in most cases. 
They also held that s. 10(b) does not mandate the 
presence of defence counsel throughout a custodial 
interrogation.
 
s.  10(b) – A One-Time Matter or a 
Continuing Right?
 
The majority noted that s. 10(a), the right on arrest or 
detention “to be informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor”, imposed a duty on police to give the 
detainee information at a discrete point in time. 
There is no requirement to convey this information 
more than once, unless the reasons themselves 
change. The right of habeas corpus found in s. 10(c), 
on the other hand, is a continuing right.
 
The purpose of s. 10(b) is to inform the detainee of 
their rights and provide them with an opportunity to 
get legal advice immediately upon detention 
relevant to their legal situation on how to exercise 
their rights which, in the case of a custodial 
interrogation, is primarily to understand their s. 7 
right to choose whether to cooperate with the police 
or not (the right to silence). The purpose is fulfilled 
in two ways. First, the detainee must be advised of 
their right to counsel (informational component). 
Second, the detainee must be given an opportunity 
to exercise their right to consult counsel and there is 
a duty on the police to hold off questioning  until the 
detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to do so 
(implementational component).  However, 
if  a detainee invoking  the right to counsel 
is not reasonably diligent in exercising  it, 
the correlative duties on the police to 
provide a reasonable opportunity and to 
refrain from eliciting  evidence will either 
not arise in the first place or will be 
suspended. A detainee who has been 
informed of their right to consult counsel 
may also waive the right. Section 10(b), on the other 
hand, does not provide an ongoing  right to legal 
assistance during  the course of an interview, 
regardless of the circumstances. The majority stated:
 
We conclude that in the context of a custodial 
interrogation, the purpose of s. 10(b) is to 
support the detainee’s right to choose whether to 
cooperate with the police investigation or not, 
by giving him access to legal advice on the 
situation he is facing.  This is achieved by 
requiring that he be informed of the right to 
consult counsel and, if he so requests, be given 
an opportunity to consult counsel. [para. 32]
 
Finally, a detainee has an absolute right to silence 
and therefore ultimate control over the interrogation. 
They have the right not to say anything, to decide 
what to say, and when. Normally, s. 10(b) will afford 
the detainee a single consultation (“a one-time 
matter”) with a lawyer. And it will be assumed that 
the initial legal advise received was sufficient and 
correct in relation to how the detainee should 
exercise their rights in the context of the police 
interrogation.
 
Right to Have a Lawyer Present During  the 
Interview
 
The majority refused to transplant a U.S. Miranda 
style rule, which recognizes a right to have counsel 
present during  a police interview, into the scope of 
s. 10(b):
 
We conclude that s. 10(b) should not be 
interpreted as conferring a constitutional right to 
have a lawyer present throughout a police 
interview.   There is of course nothing to prevent 
counsel from being present at an interrogation 
where all sides consent, as already occurs.   The 
police remain free to facilitate such an 
“s. 10(b) should not be 
interpreted as conferring 
a constitutional right to 
have a lawyer present 
throughout a police 
interview.”  
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arrangement if they so choose, and the detainee 
may wish to make counsel’s presence a 
precondition of giving a statement. [para. 42]
 
Right to Re-Consult Counsel
 
There will be some circumstances where a further 
consultation with counsel may be constitutionally 
required. This will generally occur where there is a 
material change in the detainee’s situation after the 
initial consultation. This further right to an additional 
consultation will arise where there are new 
developments occurring  which may render the 
initial advice no longer adequate and further 
consultation will be needed to fulfill the purpose of 
s. 10(b) - to provide the detainee with legal advice 
on their choice of whether to cooperate with the 
police investigation or decline to do so. In order to 
guide police investigators, the majority provided 
some examples where the right of further 
consultation is required.
 
New Procedures Involving  the Detainee. These 
would include non-routine procedures, like 
participation in a line-up or submitting  to a 
polygraph, which will not generally fall within the 
expectation of the advising  lawyer at the time of the 
initial consultation.  The initial advice of legal 
counsel will be geared to the expectation that the 
police will seek to question the detainee. It follows 
that to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b) - providing  the 
detainee with the information necessary to making  a 
meaningful choice about whether to cooperate in 
these new procedures - further advice from counsel 
is necessary.
 
Change in  Jeopardy. The detainee is advised upon 
detention of the reasons therefor (s. 10(a)).   The s. 
10(b) advice and opportunity to consult counsel 
follows this.  The advice given by counsel will be 
tailored to the situation as the detainee and his 
lawyer then understand it.   If the investigation takes 
a new and more serious turn as events unfold, the 
initial advice given may no longer be adequate to 
the actual situation, or jeopardy, the detainee faces.  
In order to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b), the 
detainee must be given a further opportunity to 
consult with counsel and obtain advice on the new 
situation. 
R e a s o n t o Q u e s t i o n  t h e D e t a i n e e ’s 
Understanding of their s. 10(b) Right.  If 
circumstances indicate that a detainee may not have 
understood the initial s. 10(b) advice about the right 
to counsel, a duty may be imposed on the police to 
give the detainee a further opportunity to talk to a 
lawyer. Similarly, if the police undermine the legal 
advice that the detainee has received, this may have 
the effect of distorting  or nullifying  it, thereby 
undercutting  the purpose of s. 10(b). In order to 
counteract this effect, it has been found necessary to 
give the detainee a further right to consult counsel. 
 
The common police tactic of gradually revealing 
(actual or fake) evidence to the detainee in order to 
demonstrate or exaggerate the strength of the case 
against him does not automatically trigger the right 
to a second consultation with a lawyer, giving  rise to 
renewed s. 10(b) rights. However, the police are at 
liberty to facilitate any number of further 
consultations with counsel, perhaps even using  this 
as a technique to reassure a detainee that further 
access to counsel will be available if needed.
 
These few recognized exceptions, or change of 
circumstances, must be objectively observable in 
order to trigger the additional implementational 
duties. For example, it is not enough for an accused 
to merely assert after the fact that they were 
confused or needed help.
 
In this case, the accused did not fall into any of the 
recognized categories for a renewed right to 
counsel. His jeopardy remained the same (a murder 
charge), he was not asked to participate in a line-up, 
he was never confused about his legal options, and 
the police representations as to the strength of the 
evidence against him did not require the need to 
talk to a lawyer again. The accused’s s. 10(b) rights 
were not breached and his appeal was dismissed.
 
Different Views
 
Justice Binnie also declined to adopt the submission 
that s. 10(b) requires the presence of defence 
counse l , on reques t , dur ing  a cus todia l 
interrogation. In his view, however, a further 
consultation with counsel may be required not only 
in “changed circumstances” but also in “evolving 
circumstances.” The detainee’s request to consult 
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again with a lawyer must be (1) related to the need 
for legal assistance, not simply to delay or distract 
from the police interrogation, and (2) such a request 
must be reasonably justified by the objective 
circumstances, which were or ought to have been 
apparent to the police during  the interrogation. 
Justice Binnie would have excluded the confessions 
and the re-enactment, allowed the appeal, and 
ordered a new trial. Justices Lebel and Fish, writing  a 
three member minority opinion, found Justice 
Binnie’s intermediate stance on s. 10(b) did not go 
far enough. They favoured an ongoing  right to the 
assistance of counsel, not merely a one-time 
consultation. They too, like Justice Binnnie, would 
have excluded the confessions and the re-
enactment, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new 
trial.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
 
TIME TO CALL LAWYER OF 
CHOICE NOT UNLIMITED
R. v. McCrimmon, 2010 SCC 36
The accused was arrested at his home 
in relation to eight assaults committed 
against five different women. Upon 
being  informed of the reasons for his 
arrest, his right to counsel (including 
Legal Aid), and his right to remain silent, he stated 
that he wished to speak to his own lawyer. He was 
transported to the police detachment where the 
police were unable to reach the lawyer he requested 
- they called the lawyer’s office and left a message 
on an answering  machine. The accused agreed to 
contact Legal Aid and he spoke to duty counsel in 
private for about five minutes, afterwards confirming 
he was satisfied with and understood the 
advice. Before he was interviewed, about 4 ½ hours 
after he was placed in cells, he confirmed he spoke 
to Legal Aid and had nothing  to say to police.  
During  the course of the police interrogation that 
lasted for more than three hours, he stated several 
times that he wanted to speak to a lawyer, to have a 
lawyer present, to be taken back to his cell, and that 
he was not going  to answer questions. His requests 
were denied and he eventually admitted to his 
involvement in the offences. He was charged on an 
eight-count indictment with a number of offences 
relating  to assaults committed against four women 
during a two-month period.
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
judge found the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter rights 
were met when he spoke to Legal Aid. His statement 
was admitted and he was convicted on two counts 
of sexual assault and two counts of administering  a 
noxious substance. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal upheld the accused’s convictions, finding  no 
s. 10(b) breach. Since he had exercised his right to 
counsel by speaking  to Legal Aid and had expressed 
satisfaction with the advice, he had no right to speak 
to the lawyer of his choice prior to being 
interviewed. His contention that the police were 
also required to refrain from questioning  him once 
he asked to speak with a lawyer again was also 
rejected. He appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada arguing  that his rights under s. 10(b) were 
violated when the police failed to hold off the 
custodial interview until he consulted counsel of his 
choice, denied him the right to have counsel present 
during  the interview, and repeatedly denied his 
requests for further consultation during  the course of 
the interrogation.
 
For the reasons expressed in Sinclair, the majority 
rejected the accused’s argument that he was entitled, 
at his request, to have his lawyer present during  his 
interrogation.
 
Right to Counsel of Choice
 
Included in s. 10(b) is the right to choose counsel:
 
Where the detainee opts to exercise the right to 
counsel by speaking  with a specific lawyer, s. 
10(b) entitles him or her to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact chosen counsel.  If the 
chosen lawyer is not immediately available, the 
detainee has the right to refuse to contact 
another counsel and wait a reasonable amount 
of time for counsel of choice to become 
available.  Provided the detainee exercises 
reasonable diligence in the exercise of these 
rights, the police have a duty to hold off 
questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit 
evidence from the detainee until he or she has 
had the opportunity to consult with counsel of 
choice.  If the chosen lawyer cannot be available 
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within a reasonable period of 
time, the detainee is expected 
to exercise his or her right to 
counsel by calling  another 
lawyer, or the police duty to 
hold off will be suspended. 
[para. 17]
 
However, what is a reasonable 
amount of time will depend on 
the circumstances as a whole, 
including  the seriousness of the 
charge and the urgency of the 
investigation. The purpose of the 
right to counsel on arrest or 
detention is intended to provide detainees with 
immediate legal advice about their rights and 
obligations under the law, most notably the right to 
remain silent. Because of this need for immediate 
legal advice, information about the existence and 
availability of duty counsel and Legal Aid plans are 
part of the standard caution and the detained person 
must exercise reasonable diligence.  Since the 
accused had agreed to speak to Legal Aid when his 
lawyer was not immediately available and expressed 
satisfaction with the advice, there was no further 
obligation on the police to hold off the interrogation 
until such time as his lawyer of choice became 
available.
 
Renewed Right to Counsel
 
In Sinclair the majority concluded that detainees 
should be able to speak to a lawyer again during  the 
course of a custodial interrogation where there is a 
change in circumstances such as new procedures 
involving  the detainee, a change in the jeopardy 
facing  the detainee, or reason to believe the first 
information provided was deficient.   However, here 
there was no objectively discernible change in 
circumstances which gave rise to a right to consult 
again with counsel. The gradual or progressive 
revelation of evidence that incriminates the detainee 
does not, without more, give rise under s. 10(b) to a 
renewed right to consult with counsel.  However, 
where developments in the investigation suggest that 
the detainee may be confused about his choices and 
right to remain silent, the right to another 
opportunity to speak with a lawyer under s. 10(b) 
may be triggered. But there were no changed 
circumstances during  the course of the 
interrogation that required another 
consultation with a lawyer.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and 
his convictions were affirmed.
 
Different Views
 
Justice Binnie would have also dismissed 
the appeal, but for somewhat different 
reasons. In his view, the accused’s s. 
10(b) right to counsel was not exhausted 
when he received his initial advice from 
duty counsel. Although his further requests were for 
the purposes of satisfying  a need for legal assistance, 
rather than delay or distraction, there was nothing  to 
suggest his requests could be considered reasonably 
justified by the objective circumstances that were or 
ought to have been apparent to the officer. The three 
judge minority, on the other hand, concluded that 
the accused’s incriminating  statements should have 
been excluded. He sought but was denied access to 
counsel. In their view, the right to counsel is not 
spent upon an initial exercise of it and a renewal of 
the right does not depend on a manifest or material 
change in jeopardy in the opinion of the police 
interrogator. They would have ordered a new trial.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
s. 10(b) DOES NOT REQUIRE 
POLICE TO MONITOR QUALITY 
OF LEGAL ADVICE
R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37 
The accused was arrested around 
noon on a Saturday in connection 
with the murder of a woman found 
stabbed to death in her house. He 
admitted he had taken some pills 
and was escorted to the hospital out of a concern for 
his health. He was subsequently cautioned in the 
emergency ward, about five hours after his arrest. 
Police told him that he could call any lawyer he 
wanted, informed him of the availability of free duty 
counsel, and provided him with a telephone book 
and the toll-free number for Legal Aid. He said he 
“If the chosen lawyer 
cannot be available within 
a reasonable period of 
time, the detainee is 
expected to exercise his 
or her right to counsel by 
calling another lawyer, or 
the police duty to hold 
off will be suspended.”  
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understood the rights and that he 
wanted to wait until the next day 
to contact counsel. Around 
midnight, after being  released 
from the hospital and taken to the 
police detachment, the accused 
was again cautioned and, after 
asking  to speak with a free lawyer, 
spoke to Legal Aid for about three 
minutes in private. He was then 
placed back in his cell. Around 8 
a.m. Sunday morning, the accused 
was offered another opportunity to speak to counsel. 
He chose to speak to his lawyer of choice and a 
message was left on an answering  machine. An 
officer told the accused that his lawyer would likely 
not be available until the next day since the office 
was closed, and he opted to speak to duty counsel 
again – this call lasted about one minute. About an 
hour later he was taken for an interview, but prior to 
it starting  he was offered another opportunity to 
contact a lawyer, which he declined. He was re-
cautioned about his right to silence, told anything  he 
said could be used as evidence, and told he could 
stop the interview at any time and call a lawyer. He 
was then interviewed by a police investigator for 
approximately three hours. It was videotaped.
 
During  a voir dire in the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench, the accused’s statement to the police was 
declared inadmissible as a result of his Charter right 
to counsel being  violated. The trial judge identified 
two s. 10(b) breaches. First, the accused was not 
informed of his right to counsel immediately upon 
arrest, but at the hospital some hours later. The 
judge, however, found this to be insignificant 
because no evidence was gathered during  this delay. 
Second, he found the police actively discouraged 
the accused from waiting  for a return call from his 
lawyer of choice. The lack of investigative 
urgency and the absence of any indication that his 
lawyer of choice would not be available within a 
reasonable time, the police failure in holding  off 
with the interrogation amounted to a s. 10(b) 
breach. Given the brevity of the two conversations 
the accused did have with counsel, they were 
insufficient for him to have a meaningful opportunity 
to retain and instruct counsel. He was acquitted, but 
the Alberta Court of Appeal, by a majority (2:1), 
allowed the Crown’s appeal and 
ordered a new trial. 
The majority found the trial judge 
erred in basing  a Charter breach 
on the inferred inadequacy of the 
legal advice the accused had 
received. Section 10(b) does not 
require the police to monitor the 
quality of legal advice received by 
a detainee. A solicitor-client 
communication is privileged and 
the police are not entitled to know its content. Even 
if they were voluntarily informed of the advice 
provided, it would be inappropriate for police to 
second-guess its adequacy. Finally, the police have a 
duty to ensure a detainee is aware of the availability 
of immediate and free legal consultation. They were 
merely fulfilling  this duty when the accused was told 
about the availability of Legal Aid after his 
unsuccessful attempt to contact his lawyer of choice. 
He talked to Legal Aid twice, expressed satisfaction 
with the advice, and he decided not to call counsel 
again when provided the opportunity prior to the 
interview. He also waived any continuing  right to 
speak with counsel and the police were entitled to 
question him - their obligation to hold off was 
suspended. A new trial was ordered. The accused 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada claiming 
he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to 
consult counsel of his choice.
 
In this decision, all nine of Canada’s top jurists 
agreed that the accused’s appeal should be 
dismissed. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Charron, again writing  for a five justice majority, 
found the accused had exercised his right to counsel 
by opting  to speak with Legal Aid. Since he did not 
try to relinquish his right to counsel nor waive his s. 
10(b) right, there was no requirement for the police 
to provide an additional informational warning  that 
he had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel 
of his choice and that the police were obliged to 
refrain from questioning  him until he was afforded 
such an opportunity. 
Nor would the majority accept his claims that his 
duty counsel consultations were insufficient because 
they did not amount to a meaningful exercise of the 
“While s. 10(b) requires the 
police to afford a detainee a 
reasonable opportunity to 
contact counsel and to 
facilitate that contact, it does 
not require them to monitor 
the quality of the advice once 
contact is made.”  
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right. The police are not required to ensure that a 
detainee’s legal advice meets a particular qualitative 
standard before they question him or her:
 
While s. 10(b) requires the police to afford a 
detainee a reasonable opportunity to contact 
counsel and to facilitate that contact, it does not 
require them to monitor the quality of the advice 
once contact is made.  The solicitor-client 
relationship is one of confidence, premised 
upon privileged communication.  Respect for the 
integrity of this relationship makes it untenable 
for the police to be responsible, as arbiters, for 
monitoring the quality of legal advice received 
by a detainee.  To impose such a duty on the 
police would be incompatible with the 
privileged nature of the relationship.   The police 
cannot be required to mandate a particular 
qualitative standard of advice, nor are they 
entitled to inquire into the content of the advice 
provided.  Further, even if such a duty were 
warranted, the applicable standard of adequacy 
is unclear.  … [T]here is a “wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance”, and as such 
what is considered reasonable, sufficient, or 
adequate advice is ill defined and highly 
variable. [para. 41]
 
So even though the accused’s conversations with 
Legal Aid were brief, unless a detainee indicates 
diligently and reasonably that the advice they 
received is inadequate the police may assume that 
the detainee is satisfied with the exercise of the right 
to counsel and are entitled to commence an 
investigative interview.  The accused gave no 
indication that his consultations were inadequate. 
Rather, he expressed his satisfaction with the legal 
advice he received to the interviewing  officer prior 
to questioning.  The police did not breach the 
accused’s right to counsel and the decision reversing 
his acquittal and ordering a new trial was upheld.  
 
Four More Agree With the Outcome
Justice Binnie agreed that the appeal should be 
dismissed. In his view, the accused, prior to being 
questioned, expressed satisfaction speaking  to Legal 
Aid and with the advice he had received. He did not 
pursue any further opportunity to contact his lawyer 
of choice even though he was offered an open-
ended invitation to contact counsel prior to and 
throughout the interview. Justices Lebel and Fish, 
with Justice Abella agreeing, also upheld the order 
of a new trial. They opined that the accused was 
given ample opportunity to exercise his s. 10(b) 
rights, but failed to exercise them with diligence.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
SUPREME COURT DISMISSES 
LEAVE IN OTHER s. 10(b) CASES
In November the Supreme Court also 
dismissed leave to appeal in two 
more cases involving  challenges to s. 
10(b). In R. v. Anderson, 2009 ABCA 
67 application for leave to appeal 
dismissed [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 428, the police 
conducted a lengthy undercover sting  targeting  the 
accused after the murder of a hotel janitor during  a 
robbery. The accused made incriminating  statements 
to undercover officers, including  details of the 
murder and robbery that were held back by the 
police.  The accused was arrested for murder, read 
his Charter rights, and instructed on his rights to free 
legal advice and right to silence. He spoke to duty 
counsel by phone for about four minutes. He was 
interviewed over 1.5 hours later but was not re-
Chartered nor again cautioned before the interview, 
although he was asked if had had spoken to a 
lawyer and whether he was satisfied with the legal 
advice he received. At the interrogation the accused 
asked to speak to a lawyer and stated he did not 
want to say anything.  The interview proceeded after 
some discussion concerning  his contact with duty 
counsel.  He made incriminating statements. 
The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench trial judge 
admitted the statements to the undercover officers 
and to the interrogating  officer. As part of his ruling, 
the trial judge held that there was no s. 10(b) 
infringement in obtaining  the statement. The trial 
judge was not persuaded that the interrogator was 
required to give any further Charter advisement to 
the accused when the arresting  officer had already 
done so not long  before the interview. His appeal to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal was dismissed. The 
Court of Appeal rejected his suggestion that, 
regardless of the circumstances, the police must 
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hold off from interviewing  a detainee if they seem 
diffident about answering  questions without more 
legal advice. He had also contended that a detainee 
did not have only a single opportunity to talk to a 
lawyer (the cinematic “one phone call”). The Court 
of Appeal found no general proposition in law that a 
detainee possesses a broad constitutional immunity 
from questioning, such that if a detainee indicates a 
reluctance to answer questions absent counsel, the 
police must treat that situation as triggering  a fresh 
duty under s. 10(b) to “hold off” pending  a further 
opportunity to speak to counsel. In holding  there 
was no s.10(b) Charter breach, the Court of Appeal 
stated:
The police are entitled to interview detainees 
after they have talked to counsel provided that 
there is no intervening breach of the detainee’s 
Charter rights or involuntariness, or lack of 
operating mind. During  such interviews, the 
police can “out manouevre” the detainee and 
persevere in their effort to acquire evidence by 
seeking to persuade the detainee to speak. [at 
para. 32]
In R. v. Alix, 2010 QCCA 1055 application for leave 
to appeal dismissed [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 278, the 
accused was charged with first degree murder and 
attempted murder related to two separate fire 
incidents: (1) a fire that killed her mother in 2001 
and (2) a fire that killed her one-year-old son in 
2003. Following  the fire at her home, the accused 
made various statements to a number of people, 
including  police officers. Those statements were 
admitted in evidence by a Quebec Superior Court, 
including  a statement made to police the day she 
was arrested. She was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of first degree murder, against her mother 
and daughter, and one count of attempted murder, 
against another person. The accused challenged the 
admissibility of her statements on several grounds, 
including  a violation of her constitutional right to 
counsel when a police officer had refused to allow 
the presence of her counsel during  the interrogation, 
and the violation of her right to have the 
interrogation suspended if she asked to contact 
counsel again. In this case the Quebec Court of 
Appeal had to determine whether a detained person 
was entitled to have counsel present during  a police 
interrogation and whether her right to counsel was 
spent when she consulted counsel. The Court of 
Appeal found the accused had exercised her right to 
counsel initially, during  a private telephone 
conversation, and again during  a meeting  with a 
lawyer at the police station. Once she exercised her 
rights, nothing  prevented the police from starting  to 
question her and to use reasonable means of 
persuasion. Nor was there a requirement to have the 
lawyer present during  questioning. The accused’s 
convictions were upheld and her appeal was 
dismissed.
USING RECORDED STATEMENT 
FOR VOICE COMPARISON DID 
NOT RENEW s. 10(b) RIGHT
R. v. Wu & Huynh, 2010 ABCA 337
Pursuant to a court order the police 
intercepted Wu’s and his co-
accused Huynh’s communications. 
When they were arrested they were 
given their Charter rights and 
assisted in contacting  their lawyer of choice. Wu 
spoke to counsel in private for about six minutes 
while Huynh spoke for something  less than three 
minutes. An Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench judge 
admitted the calls as evidence as well as the 
accuseds’ statements. Although the statements were 
exculpatory, the police used the interview 
recordings for comparison with the wiretaps – to 
identify who was speaking. The men were convicted 
of cocaine trafficking, conspiracy to traffic, and Wu 
with an additional cocaine trafficking count.
They appealed their convictions arguing, among 
other grounds, that the recording  of their voices 
during  the interviews was a "non-routine 
procedure" (like participating  in a physical lineup or 
providing  physical samples such as blood) so that 
they should have been given a further s. 10(b) 
warning  and a second opportunity to consult with 
counsel. But the unanimous Alberta Court of Appeal 
rejected this argument. In determining  whether 
recording  an interview and using  it to compare the 
voice to wiretap recordings was the type of “non 
routine” procedure envisioned in Sinclair such that a 
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detainee should be given a further advisement of the 
right to counsel, the Court of Appeal stated:
There is no physical difference between the 
police interviewing (and recording the interview) 
for the forensic purpose of seeking evidence 
from the content of the speaking, and the police 
doing precisely the same thing  for the forensic 
purpose of seeking  evidence from the 
characteristics of the speaking. No different 
activity is involved from the perspective of the 
detainee. No greater participation of the 
detainee is sought. So the question raised by the 
[accuseds] turns on whether an undisclosed 
motive or state of mind of the police in 
conducting an interview changes the nature of 
the jural relationship between the detainee and 
the police such as to trigger further duties of the 
police under s. 10(b) of the Charter. … 
[I]nteraction between police and a detainee may 
have multiple police purposes, and the purposes 
may evolve during the interaction. The crucial 
question there was whether the interaction was 
offensive to the Charter, not whether one 
purpose was more important than the other. The 
same can be said here.
In our view, the fact that the police may have 
had more than one purpose in mind when 
interviewing the [accuseds] does not change the 
fact that there was no proven breach of s. 10(b) 
of the Charter before the interviews commenced. 
Nor did a s. 10(b) breach arise from any 
undisclosed intentions of the police. On these 
facts, we need not address the complex question 
as to when a shift in the nature and degree of the 
involvement of the detainee in the investigation 
is sufficiently different in a qualitative and 
juridical sense to warrant a second advisement 
and opportunity under s. 10(b) of the Charter. 
The Charter argument pressed here fails. 
[references omitted, paras. 70-71]
The accuseds’ appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Note-able Quote
“Always concentrate on how far you have come, 
rather than  how far you have left to go. The 
difference in how easy it seems will amaze you.” - 
Heidi Johnson
Charter s. 10(b): 
Rights & Obligations Reviewed
 
Police - s. 10(b) duties ...
Informational Duty - triggered immediately 
upon arrest or detention
 
• to inform the detainee of his or her right to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay and of the 
existence and availability of Legal Aid and duty 
counsel.
Implementational Duties - triggered only when 
detainee chooses (indicates a desire) to exercise 
their right to counsel
• to provide the detainee with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the right (except in 
urgent and dangerous circumstances); and
• to refrain from eliciting  evidence from the 
detainee until he or she has had that reasonable 
opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or 
danger).
  
Should a detainee positively indicate that they do 
not understand their right to counsel, the police 
cannot rely on a mechanical recitation of that right 
and must facilitate that understanding. Generally, s. 
10(b) will afford the detainee a single consultation 
with a lawyer. It will be assumed that the initial legal 
advise received was sufficient and correct in relation 
to how the detainee should exercise their rights in 
the context of the police interrogation.
Additional Informational Duty
• if a detainee, diligent but unsuccessful in 
contacting  counsel, changes their mind and 
decides not to pursue contact with a lawyer, s. 
10(b) requires the police to explicitly inform the 
detainee of their right to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel and of the police 
obligation to hold off in their questioning  until 
then.  This has been referred to as a Prosper 
warning. 
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Detainee - must be reasonably diligent in 
exercising right
Police duties are contingent upon a detainee’s 
reasonable diligence in attempting  to contact 
counsel, whether this is duty counsel or counsel 
of choice (a specific lawyer). What amounts to 
reasonable diligence in the exercise of the right to 
contact counsel will depend on the context of the 
particular circumstances as a whole, including 
such factors as the seriousness of the charge and 
the urgency of the investigation.  It is not about 
getting  the best lawyer to conduct a trial, but 
rather about the immediate need for legal advice. 
• if a detainee person is not diligent in 
exercising  their right to counsel then the 
correlative duties imposed upon the police to 
refrain from questioning  the detainee are 
suspended. 
• if a chosen lawyer is not immediately 
available, detainees have the right to refuse to 
speak with other counsel and wait a 
reasonable amount of time for their lawyer of 
choice to respond.  If the chosen lawyer 
cannot be available within a reasonable 
period of time, detainees are expected to 
exercise their right to counsel by calling 
another lawyer or the police duty to hold off 
will be suspended. 
Renewed Right to Counsel 
Detainees should be given an opportunity to 
speak to a lawyer again where there is a change 
in circumstances such as:
• new procedures involving  the detainee (eg. 
participation in a physical lineup or 
polygraph)
• a change in the jeopardy facing  the detainee 
(the investigation takes a new and more 
serious turn as events unfold), or
• r e a s o n t o q u e s t i o n t h e d e t a i n e e ’s 
understanding  of their s. 10(b) right to 
counsel.
No Right to Have Lawyer Present 
During Questioning
There is no constitutional right to have a lawyer 
present throughout a police interview. However, 
the police can allow a lawyer to be present if the 
police choose to do so and the detainee may wish 
to make counsel’s presence a precondition of 
giving  a statement. See R. v. Sinclair,  2010 SS 35, R. v. 
McCrimmon, 2010 SCC 36, R. v. Wilier, 2010 SCC 37.
Other Considerations
Investigative Detention
The s. 10(b) right to counsel arises immediately 
upon detention, whether or not the detention is 
solely for investigative purposes.   Thus, s. 10(b) of 
the Charter  requires the police to advise a 
detainee that they have the right to speak to a 
lawyer, and to give them a reasonable opportunity 
to obtain legal advice if they so chose, before 
proceeding  to elicit incriminating  information 
from them. This of course is subject to concerns 
for officer or public safety. See R. v. Suberu, 2009 
SCC 33.
Section 1 Limitations (driving)
The right to counsel under s. 10(b) is not absolute. 
It is subject to such limitations as prescribed by 
law and justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
For example, a lawful detention arising  from a 
brief roadside stop pursuant to highway traffic 
legislation does not trigger the rights set out in s. 
10(b). R. v Harris, 2007 ONCA 574.
Similarly, a demand to provide a breath sample 
into an approved screening  device, although a 
detention, does not require the police to advise 
the detainee of their right to counsel provided the 
test is administered forthwith. R. v.  Thomsen, [1988] 
1 S.C.R. 640. A police officer may also suspend 
reading  s. 10(b) Charter rights when they give a 
direction for a vehicle to pull over and check the 
driver’s sobriety by asking  questions about prior 
alcohol consumption or request a  driver perform 
sobriety tests. R. v. Orbanski,  R. v. Elias, 2005 SCC 37.
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NO ENTRAPMENT: POLICE 
ALLOWED TO VIEW CRIMINAL 
TRANSACTION
R. v. Imoro, 2010 SCC 50
After receiving  an anonymous tip that 
a man was selling  drugs on the 12th 
floor of an apartment building, police 
decided to investigate and an 
undercover officer went to the 
apartment building  and took the elevator to the 12th 
floor. When the elevator doors opened, the accused 
approached the officer and said, “Come with 
me.”  The officer responded, “You can hook me 
up?” and the accused answered, “Yeah man.” He led 
the officer and another man, who had been on the 
elevator with the officer, to his apartment.  Once 
inside the accused sold some marijuana to the other 
man and then asked the officer what he needed. The 
officer said “hard”, meaning  crack cocaine, but the 
accused said that he had only “soft”, meaning 
powdered cocaine. The officer asked for $40 worth 
and was provided with a bag  of cocaine from some 
prepackaged supplies. The officer used police ‘buy 
money’ to make the deal. The next day the officer 
went back and the accused opened the door, 
greeted him, and sold him another $40 worth of 
cocaine. Police then obtained a search warrant for 
the apartment and seized cocaine, marijuana, and 
the police ‘buy money’.  The accused was arrested 
and charged with two counts each of trafficking  in 
cocaine, possessing  controlled substances (cocaine 
and marijuana) for the purpose of trafficking, and 
possessing proceeds of crime. 
In court the accused plead not guilty, claimed 
entrapment, and brought a motion to exclude the 
evidence or stay the proceedings.  The Ontario 
Superior Court Justice concluded that the conduct of 
the undercover officer amounted to entrapment. She 
found entrapment occurred at the time of the initial 
contact between the undercover officer and the 
accused. The officer’s question, “Can you hook me 
up?” was the first reference to drugs raised by the 
officer (the accused made no prior offer). This gave 
the accused an opportunity to sell drugs and was 
done when the officer did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused was engaged in drug 
trafficking. The trial judge then excluded the seized 
drugs and buy money and the accused was 
acquitted.
The Crown then argued before the Ontario Court of 
Appeal that the trial judge erred in finding  that the 
accused was entrapped by police into committing 
drug trafficking offences. 
Entrapment
Although the police must have considerable leeway 
in the techniques they use to investigate criminal 
activity - especially consensual crimes such as drug 
trafficking  where traditional techniques may be 
ineffective - their powers of investigation cannot be 
untrammeled.  Thus, the doctrine of entrapment 
reflects judicial disapproval of unacceptable police 
or prosecutorial conduct in investigating  crimes. “In 
their efforts to investigate, deter and repress crime, 
the police should not be permitted to randomly test 
the virtue of citizens, or to offer citizens an 
opportunity to commit a crime without reasonable 
suspicion that they are already engaging  in criminal 
activity, or worse, to go further and use tactics 
designed to induce citizens to commit a criminal 
offence,” said Justice Laskin, writing  the Court of 
Appeal’s opinion.  “To allow any of these 
investigative techniques would offend our notions of 
decency and fair play.” 
Entrapment can occur in two ways:
1. When the police, acting  without reasonable 
suspicion or for an improper purpose, 
provide a person with an opportunity to 
commit an offence. To make out entrapment 
under this prong  the court must find that the 
police provided an opportunity to commit an 
offence and that they did so without 
reasonable suspicion. 
2. Even having  reasonable suspicion or acting  in 
the course of a good faith inquiry, the police 
go beyond providing  an opportunity to 
commit a crime and actually induce the 
commission of an offence.
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When entrapment is found “the court will not allow 
the Crown to maintain a conviction because to do 
so would be an abuse of process and bring  the 
administration of justice in disrepute.”  A claim of 
entrapment involves a two-stage trial. Because the 
doctrine of entrapment does not put the accused’s 
culpability into issue, but rather the conduct of the 
state, the judge (or jury) must first determine 
whether the accused is guilty of the crime. Has the 
Crown discharged its burden of proving  beyond a 
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the 
offence? If the accused is guilty then the judge 
moves to the second stage to consider entrapment. If 
the claim of entrapment is successful the standard 
remedy is for a court to enter a stay of proceedings.
Although the officer did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused was engaged in drug 
trafficking  when the officer asked “Can you hook me 
up?”, Justice Laskin found the question did not 
provide the accused with an opportunity to sell 
drugs.  Here the trial judge erred in properly 
distinguishing  “between legitimately investigating  a 
tip and giving an opportunity to commit a crime”:
By the question “Can you hook me up?” all the 
officer really asked [the accused] was whether 
he was a drug dealer. The question was simply a 
step in the police’s investigation of the 
anonymous tip.  It did not amount to giving [the 
accused] an opportunity to traffic in drugs.   That 
opportunity was given later when the officer and 
his fellow passenger in the elevator were inside 
[the accused’s] apartment. By then, having 
observed a drug  transaction between [the 
accused] and the other man, the officer certainly 
had reasonable suspicion – indeed virtually 
certain belief – that [the accused] was engaged 
in drug trafficking. [para. 16]
Thus, no entrapment occurred, the acquittals were 
set aside, verdicts of guilty were entered, and the 
case was returned to the trial court for sentencing. 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a unanimous oral judgment Justice 
Lebel, for the seven member court, stated:
Like the Court of Appeal for Ontario, we are all 
of the view that there was no entrapment. On 
the facts of this case, the brief conversation 
between the police officer and the [accused] 
near his apartment could not ground a finding of 
entrapment. The [accused] himself allowed the 
police officer to witness a criminal drug 
transaction. The [accused] was not induced to 
commit a crime, but was actually engaged in his 
criminal activities. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s note: Facts and reasoning  of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal taken from R. v. Imoro, 2010 ONCA 
122.
HOT PURSUIT CAN ARISE EVEN 
IF CRIME NOT SEEN BY POLICE
R. v. Tetard, 2010 QCCA 2235
The accused was involved in a 
collision. His front bumper struck 
the rear door of a vehicle turning 
right at an intersection. The driver of 
the other vehicle approached the 
accused, smelled a strong  odour of alcohol, and the 
accused admitted he had been drinking. The other 
driver contacted police but the accused fled the 
scene. The driver followed, noted the licence plate 
number, and called 911 using  a cell phone. About 
5-10 minutes later the accused arrived at his home 
and entered it. The complainant then saw the 
accused come out of the building  with two other 
people and go back inside. A police officer arrived 
on scene about 5 minutes later and found the 
complainant who showed him the damage and gave 
a description of the driver. When the accused came 
onto the balcony and looked at them, the 
complainant identified him as the driver involved in 
hitting  his vehicle. The officer identified himself and 
asked the accused to come to him. The accused 
went back inside his house. The officer ran to the 
unlocked door of the home, opened it, and went 
inside, finding  the intoxicated accused. He was 
convicted of driving  a car with a blood alcohol level 
above the legal limit. His appeal to the Quebec 
Superior Court was unsuccessful. 
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The accused then appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal claiming  the lower courts erred in 
concluding  that the police had the right to enter his 
home without a warrant. But the Quebec Court of 
Appeal disagreed. The police may enter a home 
without a warrant in cases of hot pursuit, which has 
generally been defined as continuous pursuit 
conducted with reasonable diligence, so that pursuit 
and capture along  with the commission of the 
offence may be considered as forming  part of a 
single transaction. The Court explained the 
justification for such a rule this way:
1. It would be unacceptable for police officers 
preparing  to make a legitimate arrest to be 
prevented from doing  so merely because the 
offender had taken refuge in his home or that of 
a third party. The police should not be forced to 
stop a pursuit on the threshold of the offender’s 
residence without making  the home a 
sanctuary.
2. It is not desirable to encourage offenders to 
seek refuge in their homes or those of third 
parties as significant danger may be associated 
with such flight and the pursuit that may result.
 
3. The police, in a pursuit, may have personal 
knowledge of facts justifying  the arrest, which 
greatly reduces the risk of error.
4. The flight usually indicates a consciousness of 
guilt by the offender.
5. It can be difficult to identify the offender 
without stopping them immediately.
6. The evidence of the offense that gave rise to the 
pursuit or evidence of a related offence may be 
lost (eg. signs of intoxication).
7. There is a risk that the offender would flee or 
commit a new offence and the police cannot 
be expected to provide unlimited surveillance 
of a residence in case the offender decides to 
exit.
The accused suggested, however, that this was not a 
case of hot pursuit and that the requirements of s.
529.3 of the Criminal Code were not met and 
therefore, a warrant of entry under s. 529.1 was 
required to authorize the arrest of the accused in his 
home.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada in Feeney 
concluded "that generally a warrant is required to 
make an arrest in a dwelling  house", the exception 
of hot pursuit remained valid. Nor did the adoption 
by parliament of s. 529 of the Criminal Code result 
in the abolition of the hot pursuit exception. 
In this case, the commission of the offence was seen 
by a citizen who contacted police, and followed and 
chased the accused. Under s. 494(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code “Any one may arrest without warrant 
a) a person whom he finds committing  an indictable 
offence.” Here, the driver involved in the accident 
with the accused could arrest because he found him 
committing  the crime of impaired driving  (s. 253 
CC) and failure to stop at an accident (s. 252 CC). 
Moreover, the police called to the scene had the 
power to arrest the accused under s.494(1)(b) CC 
(“Any one may arrest without warrant ... a person 
who, on reasonable grounds, he believes (i) has 
committed a criminal offence, and (ii) is escaping 
from and freshly pursued by persons who have 
lawful authority to arrest that person.”) The 
information provided by the complainant gave 
police reasonable grounds for believing  that the 
accused had committed a criminal offence, he was 
running  away from a person legally authorized to 
arrest him, and he was immediately pursued by the 
complainant. As well, the arrest by police could also 
be authorized under s. 495(1)(a). The police had 
reasonable grounds for believing  that the accused 
had committed an offence. The accused’s 
warrantless arrest was justified because of the need 
to identify him, collect or preserve evidence of the 
offence, or to prevent the continuation or repetition 
of it. 
Furthermore, to recognize a distinction where the 
original hot pursuit was made by a citizen rather 
than a police officer would be artificial and illogical. 
It is immaterial whether the pursuit has been 
undertaken by a witness before the police are 
present at the scene. Hot pursuit can even arise 
where the police did not witness the events giving 
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rise to the offence. To the extent that there was a 
single transaction, the exception to the warrant 
requirement in cases of hot pursuit shall apply even 
if the original hot pursuit is that of a citizen and 
supplemented and completed by a police officer. In 
such a case, the arrest of a suspect does not require 
an entry warrant to arrest in a dwelling  house. Here, 
the need to prevent destruction of evidence was a 
legitimate concern. The accused’s arrest was 
required to proceed expeditiously to a breathalyzer 
test, avoid the additional intake of alcohol, and 
prevent him from driving  again. And even if s. 
529.3(2)(b) of the Criminal Code applied the 
conclusion would be the same. The situation that 
confronted the police made it impracticable to 
obtain a warrant to enter and the preservation of 
evidence required immediate intervention. 
Therefore, the police could arrest the accused in his 
home without obtaining  a warrant to enter and his s. 
9 Charter rights were not breached. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DETAINEE INDUCED TO 
ANSWER QUESTION BECAUSE IT 
WAS COLD
R. v. Brown, 2010 ONCA 622
A search warrant was executed on an 
apartment early one November 
morning  following  the deployment of 
stun grenades by the Emergency Task 
Force. The accused and other 
occupants, lightly clothed, were forced to the 
ground, handcuffed, and then led outside the 
apartment into the hallway. The officer in charge of 
the entry gave the accused abbreviated information 
about his right to counsel but did not caution him 
about his right to remain silent. Apartment windows 
were opened to clear smoke from the stun grenades 
and the temperature dropped. The accused and the 
other occupants were cold and shivering. The police 
retrieved shoes and coats from the apartment but the 
accused did not identify any of the coats initially 
retrieved as belonging  to him. When asked where 
his coat was, the accused told the officer that it was 
on a chair in the living  room, a location where 
another officer had found a firearm under the coat.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
Crown sought to lead the accused's statement as to 
the location of his coat to link him to the firearm.  
The trial judge found that there was a breach of the 
accused’s s. 10(b) Charter  right to counsel but that 
the breach was not serious because the accused was 
given some information as to his right to counsel 
and the statement should be admitted under to s. 
24(2).  The trial judge also found that the Crown had 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statement was voluntary.  The statement was 
admitted as evidence and the accused was 
convicted on several charges, including  possession 
of a loaded restricted weapon and careless storage 
of a firearm. He was sentenced to seven months 
imprisonment and two years probation in addition 
to 14 months of time served.
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
ruling  that his statement was proven to be voluntary. 
The Court of Appeal agreed. The trial judge made 
several errors that undermined his finding  that the 
Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused’s statement was voluntary 
including: 
1. No Caution. The accused had not been 
cautioned before he made the statement 
concerning  his coat. Although the accused was 
given partial information as to his right to 
counsel at no time was he cautioned about his 
right to remain silent or that any statement he 
made could be used in evidence against him. 
“Where, as here, the accused was detained, 
whether or not formally arrested and charged, 
the presence or absence of a caution is a factor, 
and in many cases an important factor, in 
an swe r ing  t he u l t ima t e que s t i on o f 
voluntariness,” said the Court of Appeal. “The 
trial judge’s erroneous finding  that a partial 
caution had been given was a legal error that 
had a direct bearing  upon the issue of 
voluntariness.”
2. Inducement. The accused was cold and 
shivering  as he stood handcuffed in the 
hallway. The trial judge found the accused 
“would have expressed ownership of the 
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subject coat simply because it was cold at the 
time of the early morning  raid and on the 
evidence, [he] was cold.” However, the trial 
judge failed to take this into account when it 
came to the issue of voluntariness. “The 
[accused] was handcuffed, thinly clothed and 
shivering  after having  been roused from sleep 
by a stun grenade,” said the Court of Appeal.  
“[He] was entirely in the control of the police, 
and ... he was motivated to answer the question 
about his coat by the fact that he was cold.” 
The trial judge erred by failing  to take this into 
account in assessing voluntariness.
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
for possessing  a loaded restricted firearm and 
careless storage of it were set aside, and a new trial 
was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OBSERVATION POST PRIVILEGE 
MAY LIMIT CROSS 
EXAMINATION
R. v. Hernandez, 2010 BCCA 514
A police off icer in a hidden 
observation post giving  her a clear 
unobstructed street-level view 
observed what she believed was a 
drug  transaction. At one point the 
officer was only five to six feet away from observing 
part of the activity. The accused was arrested by 
other officers and was found to have $113 on his 
person. A female companion of the accused was 
also arrested and found to have 4.0 grams of heroin, 
1.9 grams of cocaine, 5.68 grams of rock cocaine, 
and a small amount of cash on her person.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
officer described her observation post and her ability 
to observe and hear as follows:
• at the time of her observations, the sun was 
shining  and the street was brightly lit, so that 
lighting  and weather conditions were not a 
problem for her;
• her observation post had neither blinds nor 
curtains; 
• her observations were made through glass;
• the observation post had been previously used 
by both the Vancouver City police and the 
RCMP;
• she was not in an elevated position, and made 
her observations from street level;
• she used no visual aids;
• while a passing  motor vehicle would not have 
been an obstruction to her, a passing  pedestrian 
could have been;
• she wore glasses while driving  at night, but her 
eyesight was otherwise good;
• that the glass through which she was looking 
was partially open, such that she could hear 
some but not all conversation in the area she 
was watching; and
• that no promise of anonymity or non-disclosure 
had been made to a private person.
The officer refused to disclose the nature and 
location of her observation post because doing  so 
would identify an investigative technique and 
preclude the continued use of the post on a regular 
basis, which could put the police and other people 
in the community in danger.  She would not identify 
the community members who might be endangered 
by the identification of the observation post or 
explain how such a person or persons might be 
placed in jeopardy by such disclosure. She also 
would not say whether she was in a building  or in a 
motor vehicle, whether the glass that she was 
looking  through was tinted, whether she was 
wearing  a disguise at the time, or describe the angle 
from which she made her observations. The trial 
judge accepted these concerns as legitimate. He 
weighed the factors of the case and found the 
damage to the public interest in the police being 
able to continue to use this observation post to 
investigate illegal transactions, particularly those 
involving  drugs, did not prejudice the accused’s 
ability to make full answer and defence by the 
officer declining  to identify the observation post 
with more particularity. 
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In the trial judge’s view, he was “not satisfied that 
information as to the location of the observation 
post beyond what [was] already in evidence [could] 
possibly affect the outcome of this trial.” The Crown 
had established a claim for privilege over the 
observation post information and no further 
questioning  that might tend to identify the location 
was permitted. The accused was convicted of 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 
trafficking  in cocaine, possessing  heroin for the 
purpose of trafficking, and trafficking in heroin. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing  that the restriction 
prohibiting  him from cross-examining  the officer 
more fully about the location of the hidden 
observation post and the ability of the officer to 
observe the alleged offences contravened his s. 7 
Charter right to make full answer and defence.
Observation Post Privilege
In some cases the Crown may rely upon a privilege 
over observation post information even where the 
observer’s testimony is the sole evidence against an 
accused. Justice Hinkson, writing  the unanimous 
Court of Appeal judgment, noted the following 
framework to be used when observation post 
privilege is asserted:
• The judge must decide whether the Crown has 
shown that disclosure of the information sought 
would adversely affect the public interest.
• If the public interest would be adversely 
affected by disclosure of the information 
sought, then the judge must determine, having 
regard to both the public interest and the 
accused’s right to a fair trial, whether upholding 
the privilege would prevent the accused from 
making full answer and defence.
• If the judge determines that upholding  the 
privilege claim would not prevent the accused 
from making  full answer and defence, then the 
claim will be upheld. However, if the judge 
determines that upholding  the privilege claim 
would prevent the accused from making  full 
answer and defence, then the judge must 
consider whether partial disclosure of the 
information sought can be made without 
adversely affecting  the public interest and 
without preventing  the accused from making 
full answer and defence. However, if upholding 
the claim even in part would prevent the 
accused from making  full answer and defence, 
then the claim will not be upheld and 
disclosure of the information sought will be 
required.
• If the privilege claim is not upheld, then the 
Crown will have to decide whether it wishes to 
continue with the prosecution. 
• If the privilege claim is upheld, then, at the 
conclusion of the trial, the trier of fact, in 
assessing  the reliability of, and weight to be 
given to the observer’s testimony, is entitled to 
take into account the limitations placed on the 
accused’s ability to cross-examine that witness.
As noted, the Crown will have the alternative of 
either withdrawing  the claim of privilege or entering 
a stay of proceedings. The ultimate safeguard of the 
privileged information lies in the Crown's power to 
enter a stay. As well, what if any weight is to be 
given to the evidence of the officer who made the 
observations or heard discussions from the 
observation post will be determined by the trial 
judge.
In this case, the trial judge weighed the competing 
interests and found the public interest in permitting 
the Crown to rely upon the privilege prevailed 
because the trial’s result would not be affected. 
Therefore the accused’s right to cross-examine could 
be limited. He did not unreasonably restrict the 
cross examination of the officer with respect to the 
details of the observation post. The trial judge 
weighed the accused’s right to cross examine the 
officer about her observation post against 
observation post privilege and balanced the 
competing  principles relating  to the two by 
minimally limiting  cross-examination. He also 
recognized that the restrictions on the accused’s 
ability to cross examine with respect to the 
observation post could be ameliorated by taking 
those restrictions into account in determining  the 
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weight to be given to the officer’s evidence. The 
accused’s argument that he was unduly restricted in 
cross examining  the officer, thereby denying  his 
rights under s. 7 of the Charter, was rejected. 
However, the accused’s appeal was allowed on 
other grounds and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGAL ADVICE BASED ON 
GUARDED COMMUNICATION 
MAY BE NO ADVICE AT ALL
R. v. Nelson, 2010 ABCA 349
The accused was at a lounge in 
Edmonton where a number of fights 
broke out, some involving  him and a 
group of his friends. At some point in 
the evening  someone began shooting 
in the entrance area of the lounge, killing  three 
people and injuring  three others. Police believed 
that either the accused, his brother, or one of their 
friends was the shooter. After learning  that the 
accused was about to leave their jurisdiction, two 
police officers followed him to the airport where he 
was arrested for assault in a baggage drop off line for 
a flight to Toronto. The accused was read his Charter 
rights to legal counsel. He said he wished to speak 
to his lawyer and the two arresting  officers, along 
with the accused, arranged to have the airfare 
refunded and his luggage recovered. The accused 
was transported downtown where he was strip 
searched. A detective designated to interview the 
accused re-arrested him for murder and again 
advised him of his Charter rights. The accused 
indicated that he wanted to talk with his lawyer and 
did so, in person, for 27 minutes. The lawyer left and 
the detective began his interview. The interview was 
interrupted when the detective left the room to 
attend to other duties. The detective returned to the 
interview room and the accused subsequently 
confessed after being  told there was video 
surveillance showing  him committing  the murders. 
He later accompanied the detective to find the gun 
he had used, but was  unsuccessful.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge found that when the police first arrested the 
accused they should have inquired about using  the 
RCMP facilities at the airport to allow the accused to 
exercise his right to counsel. But since no evidence 
was obtained from the accused until after he spoke 
with counsel of his choice there was no connection 
between the implementational breach under s. 10(b) 
and the statement. The accused was able to exercise 
his right to counsel before he gave any statement 
and the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2). The 
detective also testified that when he re-arrested the 
accused for murder he did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to do so. But the trial judge held 
the initial arrest for assault was lawful, and that the 
accused's Charter rights were not breached when 
the detective re-arrested him for murder. The police 
could have detained the accused for investigative 
purposes and the arrest for murder had the effect of 
advising  the accused of the jeopardy he faced. The 
detention was not arbitrary. The police had 
reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was 
intimately connected with the murder, and that his 
detention was necessary for further investigation. 
The police advised the accused of his jeopardy and 
he was able to obtain advice from his counsel of 
choice before he was questioned. Even if there was 
a breach in arresting  the accused for murder absent 
reasonable and probable grounds the breach would 
be technical and the police could not be faulted for 
apprising  him of his potential jeopardy before he 
consulted with counsel and made any statement. 
The statement would nonetheless be admitted under 
s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of three counts 
of second degree murder, two counts of aggravated 
assault, and one count of assault causing  bodily 
harm.
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal submitting  that the trial judge erred in 
admitting  his statement to police because (1) the s.
10(b) Charter breach was dismissed for lack of 
connection between the delay and the statement, (2) 
the finding  that the accused was not unlawfully 
detained when he was arrested for murder in the 
absence of reasonable and probable grounds, and 
(3) the s. 24(2) Charter analysis was in error as a 
result of these mistakes. 
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The Delay
The implementation obligations 
of s. 10(b) on the police include 
two components:
• the police must provide the 
detainee with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the 
right to counsel, and
• the police must refrain from eliciting  evidence 
from the detainee until after the right to counsel 
is exercised.
Here, the trial judge interpreted the immediacy 
requirement under s. 10(b) to mean that the arresting 
officers should have taken steps to ascertain if the 
RCMP airport facilities were available as soon as the 
accused indicated that he wanted to speak with a 
lawyer. “We doubt that this was a Charter breach at 
all, as investigating  what the RCMP had to offer 
might well have entailed further delays,” said the 
Court of Appeal in its Memorandum of Judgment. 
“There was no guarantee that the appropriate 
facilities existed, or if they did exist, that they were 
not required for RCMP purposes. People are not 
always arrested in locations where it is possible for 
police to implement access to counsel. The delay 
that was involved in this case was, in the 
circumstances, minimal and the police refrained 
from questioning  the [accused] until after he had a 
chance to meet with counsel of his choice face to 
face. Immediacy does not mean instantaneous; 
practical considerations still play a role, particularly 
with respect to the police’s obligation to implement 
an arrested person’s contact with counsel.” The 
Court continued:
In the facts of this case, dealing with the 
[accused’s] luggage and ticket was reasonable. 
He did not suggest that he did not want to deal 
with this, or that he wanted to talk to a lawyer 
instead. Also, transporting him to headquarters 
was a necessary step and no information was 
elicited from him during this trip. Again, the 
[accused] did not ask why he was being 
transported before he got to speak with a lawyer. 
The delay was not long and the detective 
ensured that the [accused] 
spoke with counsel of his 
ch o i c e s h o r t l y a f t e r 
a r r i v i n g  a t p o l i c e 
headquarters. 
The trial judge concluded 
that the delay was long 
enough to require the 
p o l i c e t o o f f e r t h e 
[accused] the choice of an 
immediate telephone call to counsel without 
oral privacy before he was transported to a 
secure facility where he could make a private 
call. Although there is support for that 
proposition in case law ..., calls made by 
accused persons in the presence of police are of 
doubtful value. The right to counsel means the 
right to consult in private. A person in the 
[accused’s ] pos i t ion could not f ree ly 
c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h c o u n s e l i f t h a t 
communication was in the presence of the 
arresting  officers. Advice based on guarded 
communication might well be no advice at all or 
could do more harm than good. [S]uch 
consultations are subject to privilege and that 
police are not entitled to know what is said. The 
less than halfway measure of overheard 
consultation is an inadequate alternative. 
[references omitted, paras. 19-20]
As well, there was no connection (temporal, 
contextual, causal or any combination thereof) 
between this proposed breach and the statement 
ultimately admitted into evidence. “The statement 
was given after [the accused] consulted with counsel 
of his choice and nothing  hinted at a desire for 
further consultation,” said the Court of Appeal. 
“[N]o evidence was obtained as a result of the delay 
at issue. There is no question that the police held 
off.”
Murder Arrest Without Reasonable Grounds
The accused’s submission that there was a second 
Charter breach when the detective re-arrested him 
for murder even though he did not have reasonable 
and probable grounds at the time was also rejected:
Section 9 of the Charter provides protection 
against arbitrary detention. By itself, an arrest of 
“Immediacy does not mean 
instantaneous; practical 
considerations still play a role, 
particularly with respect to the 
police’s obligation to implement an 
arrested person’s contact with 
counsel.”  
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a person, when the arresting 
police officer recognizes that 
he lacks reasonable and 
probable grounds for that 
arrest, would constitute 
arbitrary detention by the 
authorities. However, in this 
case the [accused] was 
already under lawful arrest. 
When the [accused] was 
initially arrested for assault, 
the police had the requisite 
reasonable and probable 
grounds. When the detective 
re-arrested the [accused] for 
murder, the [accused] was 
not about to achieve an 
immediate state of liberty. ... 
The detective testified that he advised the 
[accused] that he was under arrest for murder to 
bring home to the [accused] the full jeopardy he 
faced when he was questioned. The trial judge 
accepted the detective’s evidence on this point. 
Presumably the [accused] advised his counsel 
that he was facing  murder charges, and the 
counsel presumably provided advice with 
charges of murder in mind. Since ... s. 10(b) of 
the Charter has been interpreted as requiring 
police to generally inform persons being 
questioned of the jeopardy the person faces. This 
enables the person to make an informed 
decision regarding  whether to speak with 
counsel and obviously enables counsel to tailor 
the advice given to meet the circumstances of 
the real jeopardy. If the police initially arrest a 
person for one charge, but then change the focus 
of their investigation towards a different and 
unrelated offence, or a significantly more serious 
offence, the police are required to advise the 
person of that change of focus and to re-state the 
person’s right to counsel. [references omitted, 
para. 25]
The Court of Appeal concluded that a person is not 
arbitrarily detained when they are arrested for a 
second offence while already under lawful detention 
respecting  another charge. “[A]lthough it would 
have been preferable that the detective waited to 
arrest the [accused] for murder after the detective 
had reasonable and probable grounds, no harm was 
done,” said the Court. “The arrest for the murders 
left the [accused] with full 
knowledge of the crimes 
the police suspected he 
had committed and that 
he would be questioned 
with respect to those 
crimes. ... [I]n the context 
of a custodial detention, 
the purpose of s.10(b) of 
the Charter is to support 
the detainee’s right to 
c h o o s e w h e t h e r t o 
cooperate with the police 
investigation or not, by 
giving  him access to legal 
advice on the ‘situation’ he is facing. In this case 
there is no doubt that the [accused] knew the 
situation he was facing  and was able to get advice 
regarding  that situation before he was questioned by 
police.”
s. 24(2) of the Charter
The Court of Appeal refused to overturn the trial 
judge’s s.24(2) analysis. The accused had exercised 
his right to counsel before giving  a statement, the 
statement was voluntary, there was no egregious 
police conduct, and no prejudice was shown. The 
charges were serious and the conscience of the 
community would be shocked if the statement was 
excluded. As for the re-arrest for murder, at most, 
this was a minor breach. The purpose of the arrest 
was to definitively bring  home the jeopardy the 
accused faced. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Note-able Quote
“Every great leap forward in your life comes after 
you have made a clear decision of some kind.” - 
Brian Tracy
“Section 9 of the Charter provides 
protection against arbitrary detention. 
By itself, an arrest of a person, when 
the arresting police officer recognizes 
that he lacks reasonable and probable 
grounds for that arrest, would 
constitute arbitrary detention by the 
authorities. However, in this case the 
[accused] was already under lawful 
arrest.”  
www.10-8.ca
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EVEN IF NO REASONABLE 
GROUNDS TO ARREST, AMPLE 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION
R. v. Dene & Telfer, 2010 ONCA 796
Police were engaged in proactive 
pol ic ing  act iv i ty, a t tending  a 
s u b s i d i z e d h o u s i n g  c o m p l e x 
characterized as a high crime area in 
the city. Two officers went to a 
building  within the housing  complex intending  to do 
a walk-through because of a deluge of recent drug 
complaints made by tenants - they were not 
responding  to any specific call. This building  was 
subject to frequent complaints of drug  use, drug 
trafficking, prostitution, robberies, theft and 
trespass.  The police also had a standing 
authorization to remove trespassers. The officers, in 
full uniform, arrived in their police car just before 
midnight and pulled into a parking  lot at the rear of 
the building. One officer waited in the car while the 
other began walking  towards the front door 
intending  to enter the building. As the officer walked 
along  the building, a taxi cab passed by with two 
male passengers wearing  baseball caps and hooded 
sweat shirts. As the passengers sighted him, they 
ducked down out of sight. The cab continued in the 
parking  lot and the passengers were seen peeking 
out through the back window at the officer, then 
ducking  down again. The officer thought this 
behaviour was suspicious. The men were wearing 
hats and hoodies, appeared to be concealing  their 
faces, ducked down and continually peeked out the 
back window.
The cab pulled into the parking  lot, slowed as if to 
stop at the back door of the building, and then sped 
up to leave the parking  lot. Because of the taxi 
occupants’ actions, the time of day, and the area's 
reputation for crime, the police followed. They were 
focused on drug  and trespassing  possibilities and 
wanted to further observe and investigate the 
occupants. The cab slowed and the passengers 
peeked out the back. The officer activated the police 
lights, the cab slowed, and the occupants peeked 
out about three times before it stopped abruptly. 
Telfer, the passenger behind the driver got out of the 
cab, took a step towards the police car and then ran 
between the cruiser and the taxi, clutching  his 
pocket with his hand in a way that made the officer 
feel he had a weapon. The officer believed at that 
time he had reasonable grounds to make an arrest 
for firearms possession. The officer chased Telfer into 
a building’s basement, tackling, handcuffing, and 
patting  him down for safety, finding  a loaded gun in 
his pocket. Telfer was taken back to the police car, 
searched again, and advised of the reason for arrest. 
Crack cocaine, cash, and three cell phones were 
found. 
While Telfer was being  chased, Dene awkwardly 
exited the cab. He turned his body in a manner that 
allowed him to close the door with his left hand 
while keeping  the right side of his body shielded and 
very stiff. The officer said Dene was "blading" -  a 
technique for moving  while physically trying  to 
conceal a gun or drugs. Dene also ran, his arm stiffly 
holding  his side, but was tackled by the officer. 
Dene was handcuffed and informed he was under 
arrest. A cursory search revealed a gun in his pants 
and a further search at the police car turned up live 
ammunition. Between Dene and Telfer, two loaded 
guns, a .38 and a .45, ammunition, 20.3 grams of 
cocaine, $170, and 3 cell phones were found. They 
were charged with multiple counts relating  to guns, 
drug  possession, and breaches of probation and 
prohibition orders.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge found there was no restrictive or sustained 
display of police conduct in stopping  the cab as to 
support the conclusion that the police had crossed 
the line and detained its occupants. And before this 
simple stop turned into an investigative detention 
the accuseds ran. This flight gave police reasonable 
grounds to conclude the accuseds were carrying 
drugs or weapons or both. “While the events 
occurred beforehand did not give rise to such 
ground, once Telfer clutched his pockets and Dene 
started blading  away from the site, obviously 
attempting  to conceal weapons, narcotics or both, 
the totality of the circumstances gave the officers 
cause to affect an arrest,” said the judge. “The police 
figured the cab would stop or at least the lights 
indicated a command to stop, but both accused ran. 
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They were not detained while they were running 
away. The way each of them ran and grabbed their 
clothing  indicated to the police they had weapons 
and the police had reasonable and probable 
grounds to make an arrest, let alone detain them. 
The lack of an arbitrary detention coupled with 
reasonable and probable grounds created by the 
manner in which the accused left the scene and 
clutching  their  clothing  indicates that the arrest was 
lawful. Although the take-down was physical, it was 
reasonable considering  the flight of the accused and 
the serious threat to the officer's safety.” Even if there 
was an arbitrary detention, the drugs, guns and 
ammunition were admissible under s. 24(2). The 
accuseds were convicted and Telfer was sentenced 
to 8 years while Dene was given 5 1/2 years (before 
credit for pre-trial custody). 
The accuseds then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal submitting  that their ss. 8 and 9 Charter 
rights were breached and the evidence that they 
were carrying  handguns should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). In their view, the police did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds for their arrest and 
were therefore not entitled to conduct the personal 
searches. Even assuming, without deciding, that the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to arrest, 
there was still ample evidence to support a valid 
investigative detention of both accuseds found the 
Ontario Court of Appeal:
Their behaviour in the taxi was suspicious and 
evasive. Their posture and body movements 
indicated that they could be carrying  concealed 
weapons or drugs . Fina l ly, and mos t 
significantly, their flight from the police when 
the taxi stopped, combined with their earlier 
behaviour, provided the police with grounds for 
an investigative detention. [para. 4]
The "pat down" search of Telfer and the “cursory” 
search of Dene both fell within the category of “a 
protective pat-down search of the detained 
individual” to ensure officer safety that is permitted 
in the context of an investigative detention. Even if 
the searches exceeded the scope of a permissible 
search in the context of an investigative detention, 
the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). 
“Putting  the [accuseds’] case at its highest, the 
searches barely exceeded the permissible limits,” 
said the Court. “The Charter-infringing  state conduct 
was not serious; the impact of the breach on the 
Charter-protected interests of the [accuseds] was 
minor; and the state's interest in adjudication of the 
case on the merits is high.”
The accuseds’ appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Facts and Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice reasoning  taken from the judgment R. v. 
Dene, [2010] O.J. No. 5193.
2008 ‘EVIDENCE TO THE 
CONTRARY’ AMENDMENTS 
OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY
R. v. Gartner, R. v. Houde, R. v. Bykowski, 
2010 ABCA 335
The Alberta Court of Appeal has 
ruled that the 2008  amendments to 
s. 258  of the Criminal Code have 
r e t r o s p e c t i v e e f f e c t . Th e s e 
amendments limit the type of 
evidence that can be used to establish “evidence to 
the contrary” to rebut the blood alcohol readings 
given by approved instruments. Each of the three 
accuseds were charged with excessive blood 
alcohol levels while driving  prior to the amendments 
coming  into effect. But they were all tried in whole 
or in part after the amendments came into effect. All 
three of the Alberta Provincial Court trial judges 
found the amendments to be substantive and 
therefore did not have retrospective effect. In all 
three cases, however, an Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench judge disagreed on appeal and reversed the 
trial decisions and ordered new trials. All three 
accused then unsuccessfully appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal. Justice Slatter, in a short 
memorandum of judgment for the Court, concluded 
that the 2008 amendments did not remove any 
substantive defence and merely specified the type of 
evidence that would be sufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt about the blood alcohol level of 
an accused:
The recognition of “evidence to the contrary” 
was never a true “defence”, but rather was the 
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recognition of evidence that would rebut or 
displace the presumptions of identity and 
accuracy in the Code. Those presumptions were 
themselves evidentiary in nature. The Code 
provided that the readings on the instrument 
were accurate evidence of blood alcohol at the 
time of the driving, unless other evidence 
displaced those presumptions. The 2008 
amendments merely changed the type of 
evidence that could displace the evidentiary 
presumptions arising  from the instrument 
readings. Just because convictions might now 
result where acquittals might previously have 
been entered does not make the changes 
substantive. [para. 2]
All three appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
AMENDMENTS STRENGTHENING 
BREATHALYZER PRESUMPTIONS 
RETROSPECTIVE 
R. v. Truong, 2010 BCCA 536
The accused was stopped in a 
roadblock. He was exhibiting  a 
strong  odour of alcohol, a flushed 
face, watery eyes, and slurred 
speech. She failed a roadside 
screening  device test and breath samples into an 
approved breathalyzer instrument were demanded. 
Her breathalyzer readings were 140mg% and 
135mg% and she was charged with impaired driving 
and over 80mg%. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused led evidence of her pattern and quantity of 
drinking  prior to being  stopped.  The accused and 
her friend testified that between 3:00 p.m. and 
11:30 p.m. she consumed about one bottle of wine 
with an alcohol content of 11.5%. A defence 
toxicology expert interpreted the effects of the 
alcohol on the accused and gave an opinion as to 
her expected blood alcohol readings at the time of 
driving. The expert testified that the accused’s blood 
alcohol level at the time she was stopped at the 
roadblock would be in the range of 10mg% to 40mg
%. The trial judge found that the 2008 Criminal 
Code amendments that s t rengthened the 
presumptions applying  to breathalyzer evidence in 
the prosecution of impaired driving  and over 80mg
% offences operated only prospectively, not 
retrospectively. The alleged offences in this case 
occurred before the amendments became law but 
her trial took place afterwards.  The accused was 
acquitted on both counts. First, the judge had a 
reasonable doubt that that the accused was impaired 
when she was stopped. Second, on the over 80mg% 
charge, he found the defence evidence established 
that the breathalyzer readings were unreliable. The 
evidence adduced was sufficient to constitute 
evidence to the contrary and the presumption of 
accuracy that the accused’s blood alcohol at the 
time of driving  exceeded the legal limit was 
rebutted. On appeal by Crown, a British Columbia 
Supreme Court justice ordered a new trial after 
concluding  that the 2008  amendments were also 
retrospective.  An appeal by the accused was then 
brought before the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal.  
Under the 2008 amendments, evidence of the 
breathalyzer analysis is conclusive proof of  blood 
alcohol concentration unless there is evidence 
tending to show all of the following three things:
1. the approved instrument was malfunctioning  or 
was operated improperly, 
2. the malfunction or improper operation resulted 
in the determination that the concentration of 
alcohol in the accused’s blood exceeded 80mg
%, and 
3. the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood would not in fact have exceeded 80mg% 
at the time when the offence was alleged to have 
been committed. (s. 258(1)(c) Criminal Code)
Furthermore, evidence tending  to show that an 
approved instrument was malfunctioning  or was 
Prospective = concerned with or applying to the future.
Retrospective = directed to the past; contemplative of past situations.
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operated improperly, or that an analysis of a sample 
of the accused’s blood was performed improperly, 
does not include evidence of:
• the amount of alcohol that the accused 
consumed,
• the rate at which the alcohol that the accused 
consumed would have been absorbed and 
eliminated by the accused’s body, or
• a calculation based on that evidence of what the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood 
would have been at the time when the offence 
was alleged to have been committed. (s. 258(1)
(d) Criminal Code)
As well, the results of the analysis showing  a 
concentration of alcohol in blood exceeding  80mg
% is proof that the concentration of alcohol in the 
accused’s blood at the time when the offence was 
alleged to have been committed exceeded 80mg%, 
in the absence of evidence tending  to show that the 
accused’s consumption of alcohol was consistent 
with both:
• a concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood that did not exceed 80mg% at the time 
when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed, and
• the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood at the time when the sample or samples 
were taken. (s. 258(1)(d.1) Criminal Code)
These amendments were enacted by Parliament to 
limit the available evidence that would rebut the 
blood alcohol testing  results obtained by the 
operation of an approved breathalyzer instrument:
If it is the intention of an accused to attack the 
accuracy of the breathalyser readings, the effect 
of the amendments is to require her to directly 
challenge the condition of the breathalyser 
instrument itself, the viability of the chemical 
solutions used in its operation, the qualifications 
of the operator or the actions of the operator in 
conducting the tests in question.   Otherwise, the 
statutory presumption as to the blood alcohol 
reading of the accused at the time of driving will 
prevail. As a matter of law under the 
amendments, evidence to the contrary cannot 
consist only of evidence of the accused’s alcohol 
consumption and rate of elimination together 
with the opinion evidence of a toxicologist.  
Such evidence is precluded from being 
considered as evidence of a problem with the 
approved instrument or its use.   The science 
involved can be attacked only directly.
It might be that the accused wishes to provide 
evidence that, the breathalyser readings 
notwithstanding, her blood alcohol level was 
below .08  at the time of driving  because of bolus 
drinking  (drinking  so soon before driving that the 
she had not yet absorbed the alcohol to a level 
over .08), or because of post-driving drinking.  
Section 258(1)(d.1), as amended, permits the 
accused to show that the readings were correct 
when taken but do not reflect the blood alcohol 
level at the time of driving  because of one or the 
other of these scenarios.  This approach does not 
amount to an attack on the condition of the 
approved instrument or its operation. [paras. 
9-10]
Justice Low, speaking  for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the amendments only go to matters of 
proof and therefore were evidentiary. They did not 
eliminate a defence. The amendments simply 
modified the way in which an accused could 
challenge the breath results:  
It remains open to an accused to challenge the 
reliability of the breathalyser readings and to 
present evidence tending  to show a drinking 
quantity and pattern that could not have yielded 
a blood alcohol level over .08.   The only change 
is that she can no longer present evidence on 
either basis alone.   She must present evidence 
on both in order to raise a reasonable doubt as 
to whether her level was above the legal limit at 
the critical time, unless she is able to present 
evidence to which the present s. 258(1)(d.1) 
wo u l d a p p l y ( b o l u s o r p o s t - o f f e n c e 
drinking). [para. 20] 
The amendments therefore had a retrospective 
application. The accused’s appeal was dismissed and 
the order for a new trial was confirmed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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CORROBORATED ANONYMOUS 
TIP PROVIDES  JUSTIFICATION 
FOR ARREST
R. v. Jir, 2010 BCCA 497
Two plainclothes police officers 
driving  an unmarked vehicle received 
a message via police computer from a 
dispatcher at 9:43 pm advising  them 
of a just-received anonymous tip. The 
tip reported that a 2007 red Chrysler Sebring  motor 
vehicle with a particular licence plate would be 
arriving  at a church at the corner of a particular 
location in approximately 15 minutes with drugs 
that were going  to be smuggled across the border 
into the United States.  A licence plate check 
determined that the Sebring  was registered to an 
address in a different city. At 9:58  pm the officers 
drove to the location of the church, located in a 
rural area directly north about “one country block” 
of the Canada/U.S. border. They saw the Sebring 
described in the tip turning  into the driveway of a 
church parking  lot.  Police turned into the parking 
lot, stopped the vehicle, and arrested the driver. The 
vehicle was searched and three duffle bags were 
found in the trunk.   The bags contained a total of 24 
vacuum-packed packages, each package holding 
five baggies, each of which contained 1000 ecstasy 
tablets (a total of 120,000 tablets).
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused submitted that the information provided in 
the anonymous tip did not provide objective 
reasonable grounds. The trial judge, however, ruled 
the arrest lawful under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code, did not breach the accused’s s. 9 Charter 
right, and that the search that followed was also 
reasonable under s. 8. And even if the grounds for 
the arrest did not exist, the trial judge would have 
admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal again submitting  the lack of 
reasonable grounds for the arrest. Although he 
accepted that the officer had the necessary 
subjective belief in reasonable grounds for a 
warrantless arrest, he contended that the factual 
matrix which informed the officer’s decision did not 
satisfy the objective reasonable grounds standard.
Under s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code an arresting 
officer must subjectively have reasonable rounds on 
which to base an arrest. Those grounds must also be 
justifiable from an objective point of view - a 
reasonable person placed in the position of the 
officer must be able to conclude that there were 
indeed reasonable grounds for the arrest. There is no 
need, however, for the police to demonstrate 
anything  more than reasonable grounds. It does not 
reach the standard of a prima facie case for 
conviction and is also less than the civil standard of 
proof.  In making  an objective reasonable grounds 
assessment a trial judge must be careful to not 
conflate aspects of the testimony of different 
officers.  In this case, the trial judge included in her 
consideration the fact that another police officer was 
aware of previous attempts to throw drugs across the 
border in this area.  But this evidence was not given 
by the arresting  officer and was not something  the 
judge should have considered in determining 
whether the officer’s grounds were objectively 
reasonable.  
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
In assessing  whether reasonable grounds exists on 
the basis of an anonymous tip, Justice Frankel, 
speaking for the majority, stated:
It is well established that a reasonable grounds 
determination involves a consideration of the 
“totality of the circumstances”.  When the police 
act on the basis of an anonymous tip, 
consideration must be given to a variety of 
factors, including the degree of detail provided 
by the tipster, information as to the tipster’s 
source of knowledge, and indicia of the tipster’s 
reliability, including confirmation of some of the 
information provided. Weakness in one area 
may be compensated for by strengths in other 
areas. [references omitted, para. 28] 
The accused submitted the arresting  officer did not 
have reasonable grounds because he did not know 
the identity of the tipster, did not know how many 
persons would be in the Sebring, did not know the 
identity of the person or persons in the Sebring, or 
did not know the nature and amount of the drugs 
involved or how it was packaged.  In his view, the 
police should have conducted surveillance of the 
Sebring  to see whether it drove towards the border 
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o r w a s m e t b y a n o t h e r 
vehicle.  But this was rejected. 
Had this other information been 
ava i l a b l e i t m i g h t h av e 
strengthened or weakened the 
grounds but it was not a 
relevant consideration. What 
mattered was whether the 
o f f i c e r h a d o b j e c t i v e l y 
reasonable grounds at the time 
he made the decision to arrest. 
The officer was told “that an 
anonymous tipster had reported 
that a par t icular vehic le 
(registered to an address in 
Vancouver) would be coming  to a particular place 
in a rural area of Abbotsford at a particular time of 
night, for the purpose of smuggling  drugs across the 
nearby border. The officer then observed that vehicle 
arriving  at that place at that time.” Justice Frankel 
continued:
In my view, [the officer’s] belief that he had the 
grounds necessary to arrest [the accused] was 
objectively reasonable.  The highly-specific 
information provided by the tipster with respect 
to vehicle, place, and time had been confirmed.  
This lent credence to the tip and made it likely 
that the tipster had personal knowledge of what 
he or she had reported.   That events unfolded as 
the tipster said they would bolstered the 
reliability of the aspect of the tip pertaining  to 
the Sebring  being  used for drug-related activity.  
In addition, there did not appear to be any 
reason for the Sebring to have pulled into the 
church parking lot at that time of night.  [para. 
31] 
Since the accused had been lawfully arrested the 
vehicle was lawfully searched incidental to that 
arrest and the question of whether the drugs should 
be excluded under s.  24(2) of the Charter did not 
arise.  
A Second Opinion 
Justice Groberman was not persuaded that the 
officer had objective reasonable grounds to believe 
that the accused had committed an indictable 
offence. Therefore, the requirements of s. 495 of the 
Criminal Code had not been met. “The information 
that [the officer] had at the time of arrest 
was simply that an unknown person (the 
‘tipster’) had stated that a particular 
vehicle would arrive at a particular place 
at a particular time, and that the vehicle 
was carrying  drugs that would be 
smuggled over the international border,” 
he said. “[He] had no information as to 
the identity or reliability of the tipster, 
the source of the tipster’s information, or 
the tipster’s relationship with the 
vehicle’s driver or with the alleged 
trafficking  operation. The tip was 
confirmed only to the extent that the 
vehicle showed up at the place and time 
the tip predicted.” He continued:
In my view, the mere fact that a completely 
anonymous tipster was able to say that a 
particular vehicle would be at a place at a 
particular time was not sufficiently corroborative 
of the tip to give the officer reasonable grounds 
to believe that the accused was committing a 
crime.  [paras. 45]
Although the information the officer had came very 
close to justifying  an arrest, Justice Goberman found 
it nonetheless fell slightly short of providing 
objective reasonable grounds to believe that the 
accused was committing  or was about to commit a 
crime. But he held that there were reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the accused might be 
involved in crime and therefore the officer was 
justified in stopping  him and asking  questions about 
why he was in the area and what he was doing 
(investigative detention).  If the answers added to the 
officer’s suspicions then grounds for an arrest might 
well have been reached. The officer might also have 
chosen to conduct surveillance, which may have 
developed additional evidence of suspicious 
circumstances.  Since the arrest was unlawful the 
subsequent search of the vehicle (trunk) could not 
be justified as a search incidental to arrest. But like 
the trial judge, Justice Groberman found the 
evidence admissible under s.24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“When the police act on 
the basis of an anonymous 
tip, consideration must be 
given to a variety of 
factors, including the 
degree of detail provided 
by the tipster, information 
as to the tipster’s source 
of knowledge, and indicia 
of the tipster’s reliability.”  
